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INTRODUCTION 
No subject of domestic concern has received more public atten-
tion in recent times than environmental air pollution.! Public 
concern with air pollution has increased steadily since the first 
major air pollution "inciden t" in the Meuse Valley of Belgium in 
1930, where smog claimed sixty-three lives and left six thousand 
il1.2 Chemical analysis subsequent to the tragedy disclosed that 
the air at that time contained some thirty pollutants. The first 
shocking incident in the United States occurred in 1948 in 
Donora, Pennsylvania, where an air pollution crisis caused some 
twenty deaths and affected, in varying degrees of severity, some 
forty-two percent of the population. 3 Over five thousand deaths 
were attributed to air pollution in London, England, as a result 
of three air pollution incidents between 1952 and 1962.4 Serious 
air pollution crises have become alarmingly frequent in recent 
years. In New York, in 1966, one hundred deaths were attrib-
uted to air pollution. 5 Other incidents have occurred in Philadel-
phia, in 1966, and in St. Louis, in 1969.6 
Recently, in Chicago, following a period of extremely concen-
trated pollution resulting from a sustained temperature inver-
sion/ three times more deaths from tracheal bronchitis were re-
ported than had been projected, and the death rate from this 
cause among children was increased by fifty percent. 8 Health 
workers in the field of respiratory diseases are now generally 
agreed that air pollution causes serious health effects. One expert 
has commen ted: 
Chronic respiratory disease is now the leading cause of disability 
among adults in all the industrial parts of northern Europe and is 
becoming increasingly prevalent in the United States .... Like 
chronic bronchitis, cancer, and many other types of pathological 
manifestations, the multifarious effects of environmental pollutants 
rna y not be detected un til several decades after the ini tial exposure. 9 
The potentially lethal effects described in this comment are 
expected to become increasingly common in large cities, with ten 
thousand deaths in one crisis predicted for a major west coast 
city by 1980.10 
A substantial volume of legislation, both federal and state, has 
been proposed to control this burgeoning menaceY To date, 
however, the legislative attempts to ameliorate the problem have 
proven inadequate, and the threat to the nation's health con-
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tinues to grow at an alarming rate.12 The Clean Air Amendments 
of 1970 represent the most recent federal attempt to deal with 
the problem.13 Compared with previous federal legislation, this 
Act is the toughest and most controversial anti-pollution law 
yet enacted by Congress. It has been described as "the toughest, 
most far-reaching environmental legislation ever enacted by 
Congress. "14 
This comment will examine the various important provisions 
of the 1970 Act and their effectiveness in controlling air pollu-
tion. I ts specific focus will be upon the Act's controversial pro-
visions imposing new and far-reaching controls upon motor 
vehicle air pollution.15 Finally, possible constitutional issues 
raised by the new motor vehicle provisions will be considered. 
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE 1970 ACT 
A. Previous Federal Air Pollution Legislation 
The federal air pollution control program began in 1955 with 
a law16 authorizing the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare (HEW) to research the problem and to provide tech-
nical assistance to state, city and local governments in their 
anti-air pollution endeavorsY In 1960, Congress authorized the 
Public Health Service to study the effects of motor vehicle 
pollution upon health, and ordered the Surgeon General to re-
port to Congress within two years.18 Public pressure for action to 
combat the growing problem led to the enactment of the Clean 
Air Act of 1963.19 This Act continued federal funding of state 
air pollution control programs, but more importantly, it also 
provided for federal enforcement in cases concerning interstate 
pollution.20 The Act also designated three specific areas for re-
search: control of motor vehicle exhaust emissions,21 removal of 
sulfur from fuels,22 and development of air quality criteria.23 The 
federal enforcement action was a three-step process: conference, 
hearing, and, if necessary, court proceedings.24 
In 1965, the Clean Air Act was amended to provide for tighter 
federal control of automotive emissions. All new 1968 and future 
model vehicles had to be designed or equipped so as to prevent 
or control pollution.25 HEW was required to establish national 
standards for automobile exhaust emissions.26 Pursuant to this 
authority, the Secretary of HEW established progressively 
stricter emission standards for each model year, beginning with 
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1968 model vehicles.27 In 1966, the Act was again amended to 
authorize increased grants to state air pollution control agencies 
for maintenance of air pollution control programs, equipment 
and facilities. 28 
B. The Air I?<,Uality Act oj 1967 
The Air Quality Act of 196729 signalled a major revision in the 
federal air pollution control program. It set in motion a new 
regional approach to establishing and enforcing federal-state air 
quality standards. In addition to authorizing added funds for 
regulatory control programs at the state and local levels,3o the 
Act required the Secretary of HEW to designate regional "atmo-
spheric areas" across the continental United States.31 Next, the 
Secretary had to designate "air quality control regions" within 
these atmospheric areas.32 These regions included groups of 
communities which shared common air pollution problems, 
irrespective of state boundaries. The Secretary was also required 
to promulgate air quality criteria for each region, based upon 
scientific studies and describing the harmful effects of a particu-
lar pollutant upon "health and welfare."33 The Secretary was 
further required to issue control technology documents, demon-
strating the feasibility, costs and effectiveness of proposed pollu-
tion prevention and control techniques.34 The states were then 
responsible for setting regional air quality standards to limit the 
levels of the pollutants described in the criteria issued by HEW.35 
After developing these standards, the states had to establish 
comprehensive plans for their implementation.36 Given the time 
allowances established in the 1967 Act for adopting standards 
and implementing plans, the process could consume as much as a 
year and a half;37 and the process of obtaining the Secretary's 
approval of the plans, required for federal funding, would 
necessarily consume even more time.38 This entire time-con-
suming process had to be repeated each time HEW issued criteria 
and control techniques for a newly-evaluated pollutant. This 
inordinate waste of time marked one of the major weaknesses of 
the 1967 Act. As of July, 1970, only seventeen states had sub-
mitted standards to HEW, and only ten had their standards 
approved. More lamentably, however, no implementation plans 
had been approved by HEW as of September 21, 1970.39 Primary 
responsibility for enforcement of the standards, once approved 
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by HEW, continued to rest with state. and local governments.40 
However, the Secretary of HEW was empowered to intervene 
to enforce state standards if the air pollution travelled interstate, 
and if the offending state was not adequately enforcing its 
standards.41 But if the pollution was only intrastate, the Secre-
tary could not act unless requested to do so by the governor of 
the state.42 Provision was also made in the 1967 Act to research 
air pollution caused by fuel combustion. The Secretary of HEW 
had the authority to withdraw any fuel from interstate com-
merce if the manufacturer of the fuel or fuel additive failed to 
register a statement of its contents with the Secretary.43 
The Air Quality Act of 1967 continued federal grants to the 
states to assist them in developing programs for the inspection 
and testing of motor vehicle anti-pollution devices.44 But the Act 
provided for federal preemption in the establishment of emission 
standards for pollutant emissions from new motor vehicles.45 The 
states were precluded from setting emission standards for new 
vehicles on the theory that a multiplicity of state standards, 
differing from one state to another, would make it impossible for 
the automakers to meet all of them.46 Nothing was said in the 
Act of standards for old motor vehicles, presumably leaving the 
states free to legislate their own standards. Despite the fore-
going provisions, however, the 1967 Act, and its 1963 and 1955 
predecessors, were generally criticized as being ineffectual in 
imposing meaningful controls upon air pollutionY 
C. The Failings oj the 1967 Act 
The criticisms leveled against the 1967 Act basically focused 
upon the following asserted shortcomings: (1) the cumbersome 
and time-consuming procedures required for the establishment 
of pollution standards;48 (2) inadequate funding at the federal, 
state and locallevels;49 (3) a paucity of skilled personnel to en-
force control measures, and the failure to provide for the training 
of such personnel in sufficient numbers;50 (4) organizational 
problems at the federal level, where air pollution had not been 
accorded high priority;51 and (5) failure on the part of the De-
partment of HEW to perform its duties adequately under the 
1967 Act. 52 Perhaps most disappointing was HEW's failure to 
interpret properly the congressional intent underlying the new 
motor vehicle testing provision of the 1967 Act.53 Under this 
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provision the Department of HEW had the power to test new 
motor vehicles to assure their compliance with established na-
tional emission standards. The provision read as follows: 
(a) Upon application of the manufacturer, the Secretary shall test, 
or required to be tested, in such manner as he deems appropriate, any 
new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine submitted by such 
manufacturer to determine whether such vehicle or engine conforms 
with the regulations prescribed under section 1857f-1 of this title. 
If such vehicle or engine conforms to such regulations the Secretary 
shall issue a certificate of conformity, upon such terms, and for such 
period not less than one year, as he may prescribe. 
(b) Any new motor vehicle or any motor vehicle engine sold by 
such manufacturer which is in all material respects substantially the 
same construction as the test vehicle or engine for which a certificate 
has been issued under subsection (a), of this section, shall for the 
purposes of this chapter be deemed to be in conformity with the 
regulations issued under section 1857f-1 of this title.64 (Emphasis 
added.) 
However, the Department of HEW interpreted this provision to 
mean that it could test only a prototype of the vehicle or vehicle 
engine submitted by the manufacturer, and not, as the Congress 
intended, to test vehicles coming off the assembly line or to re-
quire any additional tests the Secretary deemed appropriate. 
Senator Muskie castigated the HEW representatives at the 1970 
Hearings for their failure to exercise their full automobile inspec-
tion power. 55 The unfortunate consequence of HEW's narrow 
interpretation of its powers was that the testing of prototypes 
failed utterly in forcing the auto industry to comply with the 
national emission standards established under the 1965 and 1967 
Acts.56 A study of vehicles on the road conducted by HEW in 
November, 1969, showed that more than fifty percent of the 
vehicles tested failed to meet either the hydrocarbon or carbon 
monoxide standard, and that for one model vehicle, more than 
eighty percent of the vehicles tested failed one or more testsY 
This discrepancy between the average emission rates of the 
prototypes submitted by the automakers, and the average 
emission rates of the vehicles in the hands of the public has 
created a deplorable situation. It is estimated that air quality 
in 1985 will be twenty-five percent higher in levels of hydro-
carbons, thirteen percent higher in carbon monoxide, and twenty-
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five percent higher in oxidant concentrations than it would have 
been if HEW had not permitted this discrepancy in emission 
rates between 1968 and 1970.58 
The Act Quality Act of 1967 was clearly an inadequate and 
ineffective measure to cope with the growing pollution problem. 
In addition to the shortcomings noted, however, the Act also 
suffered from inadequate enforcement provisions. The federal 
government had no jurisdiction to abate pollution from sta-
tionary sources within a state unless such pollution endangered 
the health and welfare of citizens in another state, that is, unless 
it created an "interstate" problem. If the air pollution occurred 
solely within the boundaries of a single state, the federal govern-
men t was powerless to intervene unless the governor of such 
state requested federal enforcement assistance.59 Apparently no 
governor had requested such aid since the passage of the 1967 
Act. 60 Even where the federal government did have jurisdiction 
to act, the only court action which could be taken to check 
pollution from stationary sources was a proceeding for an in-
junction.61 The only remedy for non-compliance was the court's 
contempt power, since the 1967 Act provided no fines for non-
compliance by a stationary source polluter.62 
Placing the authority for establishing air quality standards 
with the states also weakened the 1967 Act. Few states had the 
expertise, manpower or funds essential for the development of 
realistic standards. In all, only ten states' standards had been 
approved by HEW as of late September, 1970, and no state 
implementation plan had been approved by HEW.63 There was 
no authority for the states to enforce proposed standards until 
their implementation plans were approved.64 Another weakness 
inherent in relegating the establishment of standards to the 
states derived from the fact that large industries in a state could 
bring to bear substantial political pressure against proposed 
standards. Given the importance of resident industries to a 
state's tax base, few state governments would gamble on the 
possibility that setting strict standards would result in valuable 
industries moving to another state. 65 Finally, the federal pre-
emption of new motor vehicle emission standards precluded 
action by those states with severe automobile pollution prob-
lems. 66 Yet, as discussed above, federal (HEW) inspection and 
enforcement of new motor vehicle standards was a failure,67 and 
the 1967 Act provided no federal enforcement power to help the 
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states deal with the millions of used vehicles on the road-the 
most serious source of automobile air pollution. The combina-
tion, then, of cumbersome procedures for the control of air 
pollution, the absence of adequate funding, ineffective enforce-
men t provisions, and the unwillingness on the part of the De-
partment of HEW to utilize fully its powers of inspection all 
contributed to the failure of the 1967 Act to stimulate any 
meaningful progress in abating the growing problem of air pol-
lution.68 
II. THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970 
With the enactment of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, the 
Congress has again sought to provide the nation with its first 
truly effective anti-air pollution legislation. The 1970 Act is 
divided into four titles: Title I concerns air pollution caused by 
stationary sources; Title II concerns moving source, or vehicular, 
air pollution; Title III embodies a variety of "general" pro-
visions, including a controversial "citizen suits" provision and 
a judicial review provision; Title IV concerns initial federal 
research efforts into the worsening problem of noise pollution. 
The most controversial provisions of the 1970 Act deal with 
the controls placed upon air pollution caused by motor vehicles; 
these provisions will be considered in detail in the succeeding 
discussion. However, the Act also includes numerous other far-
reaching changes in the attack on air pollution. Although this 
comment is intended to focus primarily upon the provisions 
affecting motor vehicles, some of the other aspects of the Act 
warrant mention and will be discussed. 
A. The Underlying Philosophy oj the Act 
The 1970 Act represents a radical departure in legislative 
approach to the problem of air pollution. Rather than following 
the past procedure of establishing air pollution standards com-
mensura te with existing technological feasi bili ty, 69 Congress has 
shifted to a policy which forces technology to catch up with the 
newly promulgated standards. This shift in legislative approach 
can be seen as emerging in the Senate Committee Report on the 
1967 Act, and as attaining fruition in Senator Muskie's state-
ment introducing the 1970 Act. The Committee Report on the 
1967 Act cautioned that: 
Considerations of technology and economic feasibility, while im-
392 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
portant in helping to develop alternative plans and schedules for 
achieving goals of air quality, should not be used to mitigate against 
protection of the public health and welfare.70 
The following excerpt from Senator Muskie's remarks introduc-
ing the Senate version of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 
crystallizes this rationale, and epitomizes the underlying philoso-
phy of the 1970 Act: 
The first responsibility of Congress is not the making of tech-
nological or economic judgments-or even to be limited by what is or 
appears to be technologically or economically feasible. Our responsi-
bility is to establish what the public interest requires to protect the 
health of persons. This may mean that people and industries will be 
asked to do what seems to be impossible at the present time. But if 
health is to be protected, these challenges must be met.71 
The 1970 Act could conceivably force automobile manu-
facturers, and other industries as well, either to reduce harmful 
emissions drastically, or to cease operating their plants. 72 The 
essential thrust of the new Act is to establish 1975 deadlines for 
the adoption and enforcement of national air quality standards 
adequate to protect the public health and applicable to all in-
dustries. A newly created federal agency, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), has assumed from the Department 
of HEW all responsibilities and powers granted under the Clean 
Air Amendments of 1970.73 
B. Prouisions Affecting Stationary Sources oj Air Pollution 
1. Research Programs and Funding 
The 1970 Act continues the emphasis upon research and grants 
reflected in the 1967 Act,74 which accelerated research relating to 
all types of combustible fuels, and to motor vehicles. The 1970 
Act provides increased emphasis upon research programs de-
signed to: (a) remove potential pollutants from fuels prior to com-
bustion;76 (b) develop improved methods of controlling emissions 
from the evaporation of fuels;76 (c) improve knowledge of the 
effects of air pollution on health, and on all elements of the en-
vironment;77 and (d) develop low emission alternatives to the 
internal combustion engine. 78 In addition, the Act authorizes 
funds for the developmen t of methods to produce new or syn-
thetic low-emission fuels for both stationary and moving fuel-
burning needs.79 Most importantly, the 1970 Act continues the 
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policy, established in the 1967 Act, of authorizing the EPA 
Administrator to grant considerable federal assistance to the 
states to establish or improve regional air quality programs. 80 
2. Air §2uality Control Regions: Criteria, Standards and Goals 
The 1970 Act retains the concept of federal "air quality control 
regions" as the geographical subdivisions of the air pollution 
control effort. The EPA Administrator is required to designate 
additional regions within ninety days after enactment of the 
ActY Once all the air quality control regions covering the 
continental United States are established, the Act requires that 
the Administrator publish in the Federal Register, within thirty 
days of enactment, additional air quality criteria and informa-
tion on techniques for the control of newly evaluated pollutants. 82 
Section 108 requires the EPA Administrator to begin publishing 
lists of harmful pollutants within thirty days of the enactment 
of the Act, and requires him to issue air quality criteria for 
pollutants so listed within twelve months of the date of publica-
tion. 83 EPA reports on control techniques will be released to the 
states simultaneous to the publication of new air quality cri-
teria. 84 The states can then develop programs to implement 
"ambient air quality" standards85 on a regional basis, if they 
have not already done so under the 1967 Act. 86 The EPA Ad-
ministrator will also issue periodic reports on air pollutant control 
techniques to assist the states' control efforts. 87 
An important change in the 1970 Act requires the EPA, and 
not each individual state, to establish "primary" and "secon-
dary" national air quality standards covering those pollutants 
for which air quality criteria have been issued. 88 The states must 
then implement, as a minimum, the federally-designated na-
tional standards, although each state does have authority to 
promulgate stricter standards if it wishes to do SO.89 A major 
flaw in the 1967 Act derived from the fact that the states were left 
to shift for themselves in promulgating air quality standards for 
each region. Lacking in expertise, manpower and funds, and 
pressured by the formidable political influence wielded by large 
tax-paying industries, the states were in no position to establish 
such standards. Consequently, few states had complied with the 
1967 Act by the time the 1970 Act was passed. 90 Although the 
states now have the benefit of federally-established ambient air 
quality standards, they still remain primarily responsible for 
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implementing and enforcing these standardswithin their borders. 91 
The 1970 Act also provides for "new source" performance 
standards, designed to insure that newly built stationary pollu-
tion sources will be designed, built, equipped, operated and 
maintained so as to reduce pollution emissions to a minimum. 92 
The 1970 Act recognizes that pollution agents and combinations 
of agents fall into three general categories: 
1. those emitted from stationary or moving sources and which are 
detectable;93 
2. those designated as hazardous to the health of persons;94 and 
3. those pollutants which are not emitted in large quantities, which 
are not detectable with available technology, but which are a 
serious threa t to heal tho 95 
Enforcement of the standards set for categories (2) and (3) is 
vested in the EPA Administrator, although he may delegate this 
power to the states under certain circumstances. 96 Enforcement 
of the standards governing category (1) rests primarily with the 
states,97 with intervention power reserved to the EPA Adminis-
trator for pollution originating from stationary sources;98 and 
enforcement of the standards applicable to pollution emanating 
from new motor vehicles rests primarily with the Administrator. 99 
3. Implementation Plans and Enforcement 
a. Plans. The mere existence of air quality standards, or of spe-
cific pollution emission standards, whether national or regional, 
will have little effect on air quality without effective implementa-
tion through a strict control program. Accordingly, the imple-
mentation phase of the 1970 ActlOO is vital to attaining the air 
quality goals sought to be achieved through the Act. Section 110 
of the 1970 Act outlines the procedures for the implementation 
of state control programs. First, the EPA Administrator must 
promulgate national primary and secondary ambient air quality 
standards for known pollutants.10l Within nine months there-
after, the state must submit its implementation plan to the 
EPA for approvaJ.102 Before the state adopts an implementation 
plan, it must hold public hearingsl03 so that the residents of the 
affected area may participate in setting air quality standards for 
their region.104 Within four months of such submission, the 
Administrator shall approve or disapprove the implementation 
plan or each portion thereof. lo6 The Administrator is required to 
impose an implementation plan, or a portion thereof, upon a 
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state if: (1) the state fails to submit an implementation plan for 
any national ambient air quality primary or secondary standard 
within the time prescribed; or (2) the plan, or any part of it, 
submitted by the state is determined by the Administrator not to 
conform to federal requirements; or (3) the state fails, within 
sixty days after notification by the Administrator, to revise an 
implementation plan as required by section 110(a) (2) (H). lOG If 
the state failed to hold the required public hearings regarding the 
implementation plan, the Administrator shall provide an oppor-
tunity for a hearing within that state. Within six months after 
the date required for submission of the implementation plan, the 
Administrator shall design a plan for a state, unless the state has 
adopted and submitted a plan acceptable to the Administra-
tor.107 The state must then enforce this implementation plan 
according to the 1970 Act. 
Provision is made for a state to obtain extensions of the time-
table deadlines in connection with submitting implementation 
plans to the Administrator. At his discretion, the Administrator 
may grant a state an extension of up to eighteen months to sub-
mit a plan or portion thereof which implements a national 
secondary ambient air quality standard. lOS In addition, upon 
application of a governor of a state at the time of the submission 
of any plan implementing a national primary ambient air quality 
standard, the Administrator may extend by two years the 
period within which a state must achieve compliance with a 
primary standard.109 It should be noted that a state may adopt 
air quality standards more stringent than those proposed by the 
EPA.llo If the state has adopted an implementation control pro-
gram and later comes to the conclusion that a particular polluter 
will be unable to achieve compliance at least with the federally-
promulgated minimum standards within the three-year deadline 
established under section 110,1ll the Act permits the governor 
of the state to petition the EPA Administrator for a one-year 
extension.ll2 However, this extension may be granted only if the 
Administrator finds that: 
1. Good faith efforts were made to comply with the requirements of 
the implementation plan; 
2. The source of pollution is unable to comply with these require-
ments because the necessary technology or other alternative 
methods of control are not available or were not available for a 
sufficient period of time; 
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3. Available alternative operating procedures and interim control 
measures have served to reduce the impact of such source on the 
public health; and 
4. That the continued operation of such source is essential to na-
tional security or to the public health or welfare.1l3 
It was the intent of the Senate Committee that an extension 
should be granted only as a "last alternative."1l4 No provision is 
made for a renewal of the one-year extension.ll5 The decision of 
the Administrator is subject to judicial review by the U. S. Court 
of Appeals for the circuit which includes the state in question.1l6 
Under the 1970 Act it is conceivable that some thirty-nine 
months could elapse before a state has a program to implement 
secondary (public welfare) standardsll7 and some six years could 
elapse after acceptance of a state plan, before the state must 
achieve its primary (public health) standardsYs A major weak-
ness of the 1967 Act-the incorporation of inordinately time-
consuming procedures-does not appear to have been remedied 
in the 1970 Act. Successful enforcement of pollution laws de-
pends upon the rapidity with which uncooperative polluters are 
enjoined or otherwise penalized. The pyramid of extensions 
permitted under the 1970 Act severely weakens its effectiveness. 
The time period for implementation of state plans should have 
been limited to twelve months at the maximum since the present 
provisions will only encourage procrastination through extensive 
procedural delay. The allowance of these procedural delays is a 
serious flaw in the 1970 Act. 
b. Enforcement. Under the 1967 Act enforcement procedures 
were cumbersome and basically ineffective.1l9 As noted earlier, 
state and local governments did not adequately enforce the 
standards, and federal enforcement power was limited essentially 
to interstate problems.12O As a result, no level of government 
implemented the Act to its full potential. Accordingly, important 
changes in the enforcement procedures were included in the 1970 
Act. State and local governments retain primary responsibility 
and authority to enforce the air quality standards within their 
respective regions. But federal enforcement power has been 
e~panded to insure that the states do their job. l2l Eliminated are 
the 1967 Act's conference and hearing requirements before 
federal abatement proceedings could begin.122 Now the EPA 
Administrator can issue orders requiring abatement action by 
state agencies,123 or the Administrator may directly order the 
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polluter in question to cease violation of an emission standard 
wi thin thirty days. 124 
Whenever the Administrator determines that any person is 
violating any requirement of a state's implementation plan, the 
Administrator shall notify both the violator and the state in-
volved. If the violation extends beyond the thirtieth day from the 
date of his notification; the Administrator may issue an order 
requiring the violator to comply with the requirements of the 
plan, or he may bring a civil action for appropriate relief, includ-
ing a permanent or temporary injunction.125 If, on the other hand, 
the Administrator finds that violations are so widespread that 
they appear to result from the failure of a state to enforce its plan 
effectively, he shall first notify the state. If the failure extends 
beyond the thirtieth day of his notice, the Administrator shall 
give public notice of the situation so that interested citizen 
groups may also become involved. During the period beginning 
with such notice and ending when the state satisfies the Ad-
ministrator that it will enforce its plan, the Administrator may 
enforce any requirement of a state's implementation plan with 
respect to any person by issuing an abatement order or by com-
mencing a civil action for appropriate relief, including injunctive 
relief.126 
The Administrator may require stationary sources of pollution 
to install and maintain equipment to monitor levels of pollutant 
emissions,127 and to furnish upon request reports and records 
showing compliance with the established air quality standards.128 
Under the 1967 Act, sanctions for non-compliance with the Act's 
provisions were extremely weak. Upon conviction under the 1970 
Act, polluters who knowingly violate any emission standard or 
standard of performance are to be fined $25,000 per day of 
violation and may be imprisoned for one year. These penalties 
are doubled for conviction of a second offense.129 Tampering with 
monitoring devices and failure to submit truthful records and 
reports of emission levels may be punished by a $10,000 fine and 
six months in prison. I3o Finally, if the EPA Administrator and 
state and local agencies fail in their enforcement responsibilities, 
private citizens are granted the right to seek enforcement action 
under the important citizen suits provision of the Act. l3l 
4. Provisions jor AppeaP32 
Judicial review is available to any person (including alleged 
polluters), agency, or private citizen wishing to challenge any 
398 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
promulgated standard, regulation, implementation plan, or other 
decision of the EPA Administrator relating to stationary sources 
of pollution. 133 For the purpose of national uniformity, the 1970 
Act requires that judicial review of any federally promulgated 
air quality standard, prohibition, or emission standard must be 
sought in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia.134 Review of a state implementation plan, including any 
emission requirement approved by the Administrator, may be 
had in the federal court of appeals for the circuit in which the 
state is located.135 In either situation, the parties may seek re-
view by the United States Supreme Court. The Administrator is 
given power to issue subpoenas for the attendance and testimony 
of witnesses and the production of relevant papers, books and 
documents, and he may administer oaths.136 
The availability of judicial review for administratively de-
veloped and promulgated anti-pollution standards has been the 
subject of much recent litigation. 137 The courts have held that 
even in matters committed by statute to administrative dis-
cretion, "preclusion of judicial review is not lightly to be in-
ferred, however; it requires a showing of clear evidence of 
legislative intent."138 The test adopted by the courts to deter-
mine standing to request review of administrative acts is whether 
the person requesting relief will be "adversely affected by" the 
action in question. 139 In the area of environmental standards, the 
courts have granted standing to those being regulated as well 
as to those who seek "to protect the public interest in the proper 
administration of a regulatory system enacted for their bene-
fit,"140 because such standards clearly affect both the financial 
interests of the polluter and the health interests of the public. 
Any standard promulgated by the Administrator and any en-
forcement action taken by him may be subjected to judicial re-
view at the instance of any interested person. l4l However, such 
review must be sought within thirty days of the Administrator's 
action.142 Under the Senate version of the judicial review pro-
vision the filing of a petition for review would not have operated 
as a stay of compliance with the standard or decision in question, 
unless the person appealing could demonstrate a substantial 
likelihood of prevailing on the merits and that the interest of the 
public would not be harmed by the stay.143 The Administrator's 
promulgations and decisions also enjoyed a rebuttable pre-
sumption of correctness.144 The burden of persuasion thus rested 
--------
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upon the person seeking the review. The Clean Air Amendments 
of 1970, as finally enacted, are silent on both the stay of com-
pliance and on the presumption of correctness. Section 110, 
however, does indicate that a governor may apply for and receive 
a one-year extension of compliance for a stationary source, if it 
can be demonstrated at a hearing before the Administrator that 
the polluter meets certain requirements.145 The findings of the 
Administrator regarding the requirements "shall be sustained if 
based upon a fair evaluation of the entire record at such hear-
ing."146 It is not clear from the language of the 1970 Act, however, 
whether a polluter may appeal to the Administrator directly, 
without intervention by the governor, whether he may obtain a 
stay of compliance during his appeal, and where the burden of 
proof lies. It is to be hoped that the intent of the Senate version 
will be followed and that the filing of a petition appealing the 
Administrator's decision will not operate as a stay of compliance 
with the standard in question. 
C. The Provisions Governing Motor Vehicle Pollution 
The Report on the 1970 Act by the Senate Committee on 
Public Works indicated that continued reliance on only gradual 
reductions of automotive emissions would make achievement of 
the ambient air quality standards impossible within the dead-
lines established under Title I of the 1970 Act.147 In order to 
achieve those standards, and to protect the public health, the 
emission standards originally projected by HEW under the 1967 
Act for 1980 must now be met by 1975.148 The Public Works 
Committee determined that the establishment of motor vehicle 
emission standards was a policy decision so vital to public health 
that it should be made by the full Congress rather than by an 
administrative agency.149 Accordingly, in the 1970 Act, Congress 
established automotive emission standards. 
1. Establishment if the Standards 
a. Prescription if the Standards. Under the 1967 Act standards 
were set by the Department of HEW on the basis of economic 
and technological feasibility.150 Under the 1970 Act, the stan-
dards are based upon the levels required to protect the public 
heal th; existing technology was not considered relevan t. 151 Ti tle 
II of the Act authorizes the EPA Administrator to regulate 
sources of pollution which move in interstate commerce, or which 
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are dangerous to the public health and welfare. More specifically, 
section 202 (a) (1) of the Act authorizes the EPA to set standards 
of emission for all known pollutants discharged by any class of 
new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, except as 
provided in section 202(b), discussed below. Such standards shall 
be applicable to the vehicles and engines for their useful life,152 
and they must be based upon the degree of control necessary to 
protect the public health and welfare, whether such vehicles and 
engines are designed as complete systems or incorporate devices 
to prevent or control pollution.153 Under another section of the 
Act the Administrator is also authorized to establish emission 
standards for aircraft and aircraft engines.l54 Any standards so 
prescribed for new motor vehicles and aircraft shall take effect 
after such a period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit 
the development and application of the requisite technology.155 
The heart of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 is section 
202(b), which establishes the maximum levels of new motor 
vehicle emissions permissible by 1975 and 1976. This section 
requires that exhaust emissions of hydrocarbons (HC) and 
carbon monoxide (CO) from 1975 model year156 passenger 
vehicles and engines be reduced to levels ninety percent below 
those established by the Secretary of HEW for 1970 model 
vehicles pursuant to the 1967 Act. Exhaust emissions of oxides 
of nitrogen (NOx) from 1976 model year vehicles and engines 
must also be reduced to levels ninety percent below the level of 
emissions of 1971 model vehicles.157 The Administrator must re-
port annually to Congress, beginning on July 1, 1971, with respect 
to the extent and progress of efforts being made to develop the 
technology necessary to achieve the 1975 and 1976 standards. 
He may also recommend additional congressional action neces-
sary to achieve the purposes of the 1970 Act.uS To assist the 
Administrator, the National Academy of Sciences will conduct 
a comprehensive study and investigation of the technological 
feasibility of meeting the automotive emission standards pre-
scribed under section 202(b).159 In the event that the automobile 
manufacturers cannot achieve compliance with the emission 
standards for HC and CO by 1975, and for NOx by 1976, pro-
vision is made for a single, one-year extension.160 
A great deal of controversy was engendered by the fact that 
specific hearings were not held by the Senate Subcommittee on 
Air and Water Pollution to determine whether the automakers 
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would be able to comply with the 1975 emission standards. In-
stead, the Subcommittee used other evidence at its disposal to 
determine that the standards decided upon were both essential 
and achievable.161 In June, 1970, a Department of HEW report162 
concluded that the following ambient air quality standards must 
be attained to insure protection of the public health: 
[Data reflected in parts per million (ppm)]l63 
Carbon monoxide ......... 9.00 ppm/8-hour average 
Photochemical oxidants .... 0.06 ppm/i-hour average 
Ni trogen dioxide .......... 0.10 ppm/ i-hour average 
These prescribed safe levels of pollution are far below the levels 
currently experienced in cities such as Chicago and Los Angeles, 
where air pollution levels are among the most hazardous in the 
nation. In these cities the following pollution levels have been 
recorded: 
Carbon monoxide ... .44.00 ppm/B-hour average (Chicago) 
Nitrogen dioxide .... 0.69 ppm/i-hour average (Los Angeles)164 
The serious problem of exhaust emissions from used vehicles 
continues to be ignored by the Congress in the 1970 Act. The 
Senate version of the 1970 amendments devoted an entire sec-
tion of the Act165 to this massive source of air pollution, but it 
failed to survive the compromising process of the House-Senate 
Conference Committee, and thus the Clean Air Amendments of 
1970 are silent on used vehicles. The following is an analysis of 
the deleted section 211 of the Senate amendments. It is sub-
mitted that the decision by Congress to ignore the problem of 
used vehicles in the 1970 Act was alarmingly counterproduc-
tive. Former section 211, or a comparable provision, should be 
introduced promptly in the Ninety-Second Congress as an 
amendment to the 1970 Act.166 
Under the 1967 Act control of used motor vehicle air pollution 
was presumably left to the states.167 Under the 1970 Act the 
states still retain the authority to control emissions from used 
vehicles, but section 211 would have established minimum federal 
standards of performance for air pollution control devices or 
systems to be installed on pre-1968 vehicles. Under this section, 
the Administrator would have certified those anti-pollution de-
vices meeting EPA established standards, and once the devices 
were certified, the states could pass legislation requiring their 
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installation.16s The problem of implementing the federal stan-
dards of performance for such devices was left to the states be-
cause the Senate Committee on Public Works was unable to 
develop a feasible national system to deal with emissions from 
used vehicles.169 
At present there are over 100 million used vehicles on the 
highways which do virtually all of the serious polluting of the 
air.17° These vehicles will live well beyond 1975, when the strict 
federal standards for new motor vehicles take effect. The anoma-
lous result in 1975 will be that although the eight to nine million 
new vehicles sold that yearl71 will have to meet beneficially rigid 
national emission standards, some one hundred and forty million 
used vehicles already on the roadl72 will have to meet no mini-
mum national standards. Given the difficulties experienced by 
the states in establishing air quality standards for stationary 
sources of pollution under the 1967 Act, it is not unlikely that 
they will encounter similar problems under the 1970 Act in 
promulgating and enforcing standards for used motor vehicles.173 
Accordingly, tighter controls should have been imposed upon 
this massive source of pollution by the 1970 Act. Minimum 
federal standards for used vehicles, binding upon the states, un-
less they desired even more severe controls, would have been 
preferable. The Congress used this approach in the provisions 
dealing with air pollution emanating from stationary sources,174 
and should also have applied it to the emission standards for used 
vehicles. The Congress also rejected two national plans which 
would have more effectively reduced air pollution from used 
vehicles. The first of these plans would have imposed a retro-
active installation obligation upon the auto manufacturers, and 
the second would have established a federal subsidy program for 
installation of pollution-control devices on used vehicles.175 The 
salutary effect of either of these plans would have been twofold: 
the public would not have had to bear the full brunt of financing 
technology which the automakers should have installed on the 
vehicles in the first place; and there would have been a greater 
likelihood that used motor vehicles would be equipped with 
pollution-control devices. It is lamentable that neither plan was 
adopted in some form, since used vehicles are the source of more 
than sixty percent of all air pollution.176 The failure of Congress 
to deal more effectively with this problem may well eviscerate 
the effectiveness of the entire 1970 Act. 
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b. State Standards and Federal Preemption. Under the 1967 
Act Congress preempted state legislative actionl77 by enacting 
emission standards for new motor vehicles and new motor 
vehicle engines.178 Only California was allowed an exemption 
from the federal preemption, and thus allowed to regulate 
emissions from new, as well as used, vehicles.179 The federal 
emission standards issued for new vehicles were applicable only 
to automobiles manufactured during or after the 1968 model 
year.180 This meant that used vehicles, those manufactured prior 
to 1968, were left to state regulation. l8l The federal preemption 
under the 1967 Act was vigorously criticized as impeding effec-
tive control of automotive air pollution.182 The major criticisms 
of the preemption provision were as follows: 
1. Some states suffered from more acute air pollution problems than 
other states and thus needed emission standards which were 
stricter than the federally promulgated standards. Such states 
were hamstrung in not being able to adopt more restrictive 
standards.l83 
2. The 1967 Act did not require that the anti-pollution devices 
installed on new motor vehicles be inspected or maintained in 
proper operating order, despite the fact that the failure to main-
tain resulted in serious deterioration of their effectiveness.184 
3. The federally approved devices required to be installed on new 
vehicles, generally failed to reduce emissions of hydrocarbons, 
carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxide.lss 
4. The federal standards ignored completely the problem of assisting 
state efforts to control used vehicle air pollution.ls6 
The 1970 Act continues the federal preemption as to new 
motor vehicles, and the preemption has been extended to include 
aircraft and aircraft engines as well as fuels. The Senate Com-
mittee Report indicated that retention of the preemption pro-
vision was "to prevent a multiplicity of state standards for 
emissions control systems on new motor vehicles as required by 
section 202, or the regulation of fuels as provided in section 
[211]."187 The Committee also recognized, however, "that there 
may be unusual instances when the state would have to require 
a standard of emission control for a vehicle that would exceed 
the controls provided by this legislation."188 Provision was 
therefore made in the Senate version of the 1970 Act for states 
other than California189 to obtain an exception to the preemption 
provision, but only upon a showing that a more stringent stan-
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dard was necessary and essential for the state to achieve the 
ambient air quality standards applicable to regions within its 
jurisdiction. The Committee had intended this waiver primarily 
to permit a variance to control emissions from commercial 
vehicles.19O The House-Senate Conference rejected this waiver 
provision, however, and omitted entirely any amendment to the 
preemption provision of the 1967 Act. The states and communi-
ties retain the authority granted under the 1967 Act to regulate 
or restrict the use, operation or movement of any vehicle191 when 
necessary in order to achieve compliance with national ambient 
air quality standards and goals established under Title I of the 
1970 Act.192 
At first blush, it would seem that the 1970 Act, in retaining the 
federal preemption provision, has perpetuated a problem which 
engendered the cri ticisms men tioned as having been leveled 
against the 1967 preemption section. Such would be the case if 
the federal emission standards were so inadequate that states 
might be expected to seek tougher standards in order to main-
tain or achieve desirable air quality in their respective regions. 
However, with increasingly more stringent federal emission 
standards being promulgated for the 1972, 1973 and 1974 new 
model vehicles/ 93 and with federal emission standards for new 
1975 vehicles being cu t by ninety percent, 194 the likelihood that 
the states would desire even stricter emission standards for new 
vehicles seems remote. The need for state exceptions to the 
federal preemption provision of the 1967 Act will be precluded if 
the EPA Administrator promulgates emission standards for new 
motor vehicles as low as technologically possible between 1971 
and 1975, when the lowest emission standards take effect. The 
issue of federal preemption of new motor vehicle standards should 
become academic in 1975, when the federal standards will be as 
stringent as any state could technologically and realistically 
wan t to adopt. 
But there is some merit to the contention that between the 
years 1971 and 1975 all the states should, like California, be free 
to adopt emission standards which are more stringent than the 
federal standards. The constitutional requirement of equal pro-
tection of the laws195 should afford the states grounds to test the 
privileged status accorded California. If the federal standards are 
appreciably more lenient than those California establishes for 
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herself between 1971 and 1975, then the states may attack the 
constitutionality of the preemption provision, arguing that they 
should be equally entitled to adopt stricter standards.196 
2. Regulation oj Fuels 
Fuel combustion is the major cause of air pollution. Yet, defini-
tive knowledge of the deleterious effects of fuels and additives is 
still meager.197 The 1967 Act did not regulate fuels on their 
contents. Rather, provision was made only for (a) research on 
air pollution caused by fuel combustion198 and (b) the registra-
tion with the Secretary of HEW of all additives in fuels. 199 The 
latter provision, however, was never enforced by the Secretary.200 
A sufficient base of scientific and technical information is now 
available to indicate that certain fuel additives are potentially 
perilous to human health. This is particularly true of lead addi-
tives, which both contaminate the environment and deteriorate 
devices installed on motor vehicles to control the emissions of 
other pollutants.201 The 1970 Act continues the requirement that 
fuels and fuel additives be registered with the EPA Administra-
tor.202 But more importantly, authority is now given the EPA 
Administrator to regulate the actual sale and use of fuels. 203 
The procedure is as follows: the EPA Administrator will desig-
nate fuels acceptable for use in vehicles. Once designated, the 
fuel must be registered with the EPA before it can be sold. If 
such fuel has not been registered, the Administrator will prevent 
its being introduced into commerce.204 The EPA Administrator 
may either prohibit entirely or regulate the sale of any fuel 
which, when evaporated or burned, endangers the public health 
or impedes achievement of effective emission control.2°5 But in 
so doing, the Administrator must find that such a prohibition or 
control will not result in the use of any other fuel that would pro-
duce equal or greater hazards to the public health or welfare.206 
No fuel or fuel additive may be controlled or prohibited by the 
Administrator until he has considered all relevant medical, 
scientific, technological and economic factors.207 On request of a 
manufacturer of motor vehicles, motor vehicle engines, fuels or 
fuel additives, the Administrator will hold a public hearing and 
publish the results thereof at the time he promulgates final 
regulations.208 Despite the federal preemption in the area of fuel 
regulation, with the exception of California, a state may control 
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or prohibit the use of a fuel or fuel additive in motor vehicles only 
if an applicable implementation plan under section 110 so pro-
vides and if the Administrator approves the plan.209 The Ad-
ministrator may approve such a provision in an implementation 
plan only if he finds that the state control or prohibition is 
necessary to achieve the national primary or secondary am bien t 
air quality standards which the plan implements.21o 
3. Alternatives to the Internal Combustion Engine 
Based upon present trends, it is possible that by 1980 the in-
crease in the number of vehicles in densely populated areas will 
begin to outstrip technological capabilities for reducing pollution 
from the internal combustion engine. If by 1975 the automobile 
industry is unsuccessful in modifying the internal combustion 
engine to meet prescribed emission standards, and unless motor 
vehicles with an alternative, low-pollution power source are 
available, vehicle caused pollution will continue to menace the 
nation's health. Accordingly, the 1970 Act authorizes the EPA 
Administrator to establish special emission standards for research 
and development purposes and to encourage and promote the 
development of low-emission vehicles.211 The research conducted 
pursuan t to this provision will also provide the EPA Administra-
tor with additional information as to whether the technology is 
in fact available to meet the 1975 new vehicle emission standards 
set forth in section 202(b) of the Act. More importantly, how-
ever, the 1970 Act provides increased emphasis on efforts to 
develop low-emission alternatives to the internal combustion 
engine.212 Section 104 of the Act authorizes expenditures of $350 
million dollars from 1971 through 1973 for the purpose of de-
veloping such alternatives and for fuel research.213 Two important 
features of this provision are that amounts appropriated will 
remain available until expended, and that a legal basis is provided 
for supporting demonstration projects involving the construction 
and installation of pollution control equipment in profit-making 
facilities in order to gain maximum benefit from expertise in the 
practical application of technology.214 The National Air Pollu-
tion Control Administration developed a six-year plan, designed 
to run from 1970 to 1975, for the development of alternatives to 
the internal combustion engine, including both the control of 
emissions from conventional motor vehicles, and the development 
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of unconventional low-pollution vehicles.215 The appropriations 
made in the 1970 Act will continue the important research for 
alternatives. 
For the purpose of developing low-emission vehicles, section 
212 of the 1970 Act establishes a "Low-Emission Vehicle Certifi-
cation Board"216 which is empowered to certify, in accordance 
with prescribed procedures, those vehicles which are "low-emis-
sion" and which are thus suitable to replace high-emission ve-
hicles presently being used by federal agencies.217 Any party may 
submit a vehicle for certification-private persons as well as the 
large automakers. Once certified, low-emission vehicles will be 
purchased or leased by the federal government at procurement 
costs of up to one hundred and fifty percent of the retail price of 
the least expensive model vehicles for which they are certified 
replacements.218 Moreover, in order to encourage industry and 
private parties to develop "inherently low-polluting propulsion 
technology," the Board, at its discretion, may raise the price the 
federal government will pay to two hundred percent of the retail 
price of the replacements, if the Board determines that the certi-
fied low-emission vehicle is powered by "an inherently low-
polluting propulsion system."219 Section 212 of the 1970 Act 
authorizes funds in addition to those authorized under section 
104220 for the purpose of encouraging the development of alterna-
tives to the internal combustion engine. 
It appears, however, that the automobile industry has chosen 
to attempt to clean up the internal combustion engine rather than 
to develop an alternative propulsion system.221 Senator Muskie 
indicated during the Senate Committee Hearings that during his 
seven years on the Committee the automobile industry has shown 
no sense of urgency with respect to developing alternatives to the 
internal combustion engine.222 Only General Motors has recently 
indicated a serious financial commitment to invest in a propulsion 
system other than the conventional internal combustion engine 
by purchasing the rights to the Wankel rotary engine.223 No one 
knows for certain whether the automobile industry can achieve 
the 1975 standards with the internal combustion engine. If the 
industry can, it has indicated precisely the contrary.224 But the 
urgency of the situation requires that the industry and the federal 
government move with all haste to develop alternatives by 1975 
in the event that the 1975 standards cannot be met with the in-
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ternal combustion engine.225 It must be kept clearly in mind that 
the 1975 standards are based upon pollution levels vital to the 
protection of public health, and are not merely a frivolous at-
tempt to harass the automobile industry or to inconvenience the 
driving public. With this in mind, it would seem that if by 1975 
the internal combustion engine cannot be redesigned to comply 
with the standards required under the 1970 Act, the availability 
of an alternative power source will be essential. Initiation of timely 
action now, directed toward the development of such an alterna-
tive, would seem a far more prudent application of the limited 
time and resources available than deferral of such a quest until 
1975, when pollution levels may well be critical, and the search 
for alternatives desperate. Simultaneously, during the period 
from 1971 to 1975, federal funds should be diverted from the 
construction of additional highways in order to subsidize major 
expansion of local mass transit systems. A reduced dependence 
upon the automobile, developed through the increased avail-
ability of convenient public transportation, would contribute con-
siderably to abating vehicular air pollution.226 
Apparently, the automobile industry has chosen to gamble on 
the internal combustion engine. But in so choosing, it should not 
be permitted to gamble with the health of the nation. If the in-
dustry loses its gamble, it is clear that the internal combustion 
engine must be outlawed within a specified time.227 A bill to ban 
the internal combustion engine in California, a state with long 
and frustrating experience in combating automotive air pollution, 
was narrowly defeated in 1969.228 A similar provision was offered 
as an amendment to an early version of the 1970 Act,229 but was 
not included in the final version. Such proposals would have 
seemed too drastic several years ago, and while they are still im-
practical, the near passage of the California bill has put the auto-
mobile industry on notice that the nation intends to secure clean 
air.230 Accordingly, the inclusion of federal financial support for 
research to develop alternatives to the internal combustion en-
gine is as important a provision as can be found in the entire 1970 
Act. 
4. Enjorcement oj the Standards 
a. Federal Enjorcement Powers. Two major weaknesses of the 
1967 Act were lack of adequate pollution prevention measures 
and lack of strong enforcement sanctions. The 1970 Act has 
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strengthened both. The federal government will play its role in 
enforcing the tough 1975 standards through the provisions 
authorizing the EPA Administrator to test motor vehicles on the 
assembly line to assure that they meet the standards.231 As noted 
earlier, the testing procedure used by HEW under the 1967 Act 
was both a misinterpretation of the power HEW had been 
granted and a failure to enforce adequately the federal standards 
for new vehicles.232 Section 206(c) of the 1970 Act makes clear that 
the EPA Administrator has the authority to test vehicles on the 
production line, and is not restricted to testing mere prototype 
models submitted by the manufacturers.233 If the EPA Adminis-
trator finds that assembly-line vehicles are not meeting the 
standards for which the EPA had granted certification, he may 
revoke certification and withhold it until satisfied that compliance 
with the standard will be achieved.234 The manufacturer will not 
be permitted to distribute already manufactured vehicles to 
dealers during the period of suspension or revocation.235 Hope-
fully, further production would also be banned until certification 
is reinstated. Otherwise, the non-conforming vehicles could enter 
the stream of commerce to the detriment of the public health. 
After the EPA Administrator notifies the manufacturer of sus-
pension or revocation of certification, the latter may obtain, upon 
request, a public hearing to appeal the suspension. The appeal, 
however, will not stay the suspension.236 The EPA Administra-
tor's final decision is subject to review by the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the circuit in which the manufacturer resides or has his 
principal place of business.237 The Administrator is also required 
to publish, in a non-technical manner, the comparative perfor-
mance of the new motor vehicles tested in meeting the standards 
prescribed under section 202. In this manner, at the beginning of 
each model year commencing with 1971, the prospective ultimate 
purchasers of new motor vehicles can be guided in purchasing new 
vehicles which meet the federal pollution emission standards.283 
Every manufacturer at time of delivery must warrant to the 
ultimate purchaser and each subsequent purchaser that the motor 
vehicle or engine conforms to EPA standards.239 The manufac-
turer must warrant that each vehicle will comply with EPA 
emission standards for at least five years or 50,000 miles.240 This 
obligation rests solely with the manufacturer, and cannot be 
shifted by the latter to dealers.241 In addition, all advertising 
circulated by the manufacturers must contain a statement speci-
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fying the actual cost to the manufacturer of included emission 
control devices or systems, including installation costS.242 If the 
manufacturer finds defects in the system within the five-year or 
50,000 mile warranty period, it must notify the purchaser or 
subsequent purchasers and repairs must be made by the manu-
facturer at no cost to purchaser or dealer.243 If the EPA Admini-
strator determines that a category of vehicles on the road is fail-
ing to conform to standards, he must immediately notify the 
manufacturer and require the manufacturer to submit a plan for 
remedying the nonconformity, but the Administrator must hold 
a public hearing to review his determination if the manufacturer 
so requests.244 Unless, as a result of the hearing, he withdraws his 
determination of nonconformity, the Administrator shall order 
the manufacturer within sixty days to notify the purchaser of the 
nonconformity.245 As a condition precedent to the manufacturer's 
absorbing the cost of repairs, the ultimate purchaser and subse-
quent purchasers will have to demonstrate that the manufac-
turer's maintenance requirements have been observed.246 As-
suming that it takes another several months before the offending 
vehicles are finally corrected by the manufacturer, the above pro-
cedures could take up to six mon ths or more, from EPA inspection 
and discovery of the defect to repair by the manufacturer. Ef-
fectively then, a class of vehicles which the manufacturer has 
guaranteed will comply with emission standards for five years or 
50,000 miles could contaminate the air for months. With the 
public health at stake, this time-consuming process should be 
reduced to no more than one month: two weeks during which 
public hearings are held; one week for the manufacturer to notify 
the purchaser; and one week to effect repairs of the defect. At 
stake are months of poisonous atmospheric pollution resulting 
from unnecessary procedural delays. 
The original warranty provision proposed for pollution-control 
devices called for guaranteed compliance with emission standards 
for ten years or 100,000 miles. Congress yielded to manufacturer 
pressure, however, and reduced these figures by one-half to five 
years or 50,000 miles. A further concession exacted by the in-
dustry during the Senate-House Conference Committee proceed-
ings has virtually eviscerated this provision, however. The Com-
mittee agreed that the provision would be retained, but stipu-
lated that it would not come into effect until the EPA decides 
that an adequate system exists for testing and inspecting the 
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pollution-control devices.247 Lamentably, no deadline was estab-
lished by which the EPA Administrator must make this deter-
mination. 
Assuming that the warranty provision does ultimately come 
into effect, the 50,000 mile period can be assumed to last for ap-
proximately four to five years of average driving. Salesmen, how-
ever, can accumulate mileage of this magnitude in a little over one 
year. It is thus also regrettable that Congress decided to shift the 
responsibility for maintaining air pollution-control devices from 
the manufacturer to the purchaser after only 50,000 miles. If the 
purchaser is to pay what doubtless will be greatly increased pur-
chase prices for non-polluting vehicles,248 he should be guaranteed 
the full benefit of the bargain for the life of the vehicle. The 
limited warranty of compliance provision thus stands as one of 
the least desirable features of the 1970 Act.249 
b. State Eriforcement Powers. Under the 1970 Act the federal 
government is fully responsible for enforcing the emission stan-
dards for new motor vehicles. But, as noted earlier, the states are 
authorized to enforce their own emission standards for used 
vehicles.250 Under section 210 of the 1970 Act the Administrator 
is authorized to make grants to state agencies totalling up to two-
thirds of the cost of developing and maintaining effective vehicle 
emission inspection, testing and control programs. Before a state 
implementation plan is approved by the Administrator, the plan 
must provide for periodic inspection and testing of motor vehicles 
to enforce compliance with applicable emission standards.251 
Neither section 210 (the provision authorizing grants to state pro-
grams) nor section 110 (the provision governing state implemen-
tation plans), indicates whether state inspection programs are 
restricted to inspecting only used vehicles and not new vehicles. 
Both sections refer only to "motor vehicles." Although it is clear 
from sections 202 and 209 that states cannot establish emission 
standards for new vehicles, it appears that Congress intended that 
the states enforce the federal standards for new vehicles in their 
inspection programs, in addition to enforcing their own standards 
for used vehicles. But, except for the financial assistance provided 
in section 210, the states will receive no other federal assistance in 
dealing with the problem of used-vehicle exhaust pollution.252 
This means that the states are free to improse their own controls 
upon used vehicles registered within their boundaries, as Cali-
fornia has done.263 The states may choose to legislate that all used 
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vehicles be fitted with emission-control devices in order to achieve 
compliance with the state emission standards for used vehicles. 
B . L "" h· I b "d " d b Y IllJerenCe, a new motor ve IC e ecomes use , an su -
ject to state control under section 209, when the vehicle has been 
driven for five years or 50,000 miles. A different interpretation 
would have the states intervening during the federally required 
warranty period. States are thus precluded from regulating 
"new" vehicles which have been driven up to 50,000 miles. Unless 
state emission standards for used vehicles are as stringent as the 
federal standards for new vehicles, the variance between the state 
and federal standards will result in automobile pollution levels 
higher than ought to be allowed. Undoubtedly, some states will 
adopt emission standards for used vehicles more lenient than the 
federal standards for new vehicles. To that extent, some regions 
will be permitting higher levels of automotive air pollution than 
other regions. This, in turn, could mean that the federally promul-
gated air quality standards and goals established under Title I of 
the 1970 Act will take longer to achieve, to the detriment of the 
public health. Although state cooperation in combating auto-
mobile pollution is both necessary and wise, it would appear that 
if the individual states are to shoulder the burden of controlling 
the real source of automotive air pollution-the used vehicle-
they should be federally assisted with minimum federal standards 
for federally tested devices or systems for used vehicles as string-
ent as those for new vehicles. States should then be permitted to 
establish their own emission standards for used vehicles, based 
upon strict federal standards as a minimum, but more stringent if 
the state desires. 
The implementation plan requirement set forth in section 110 
of the 1970 Act specifically requires that each Air Quality Con-
trol Region develop inspection and testing programs for motor 
vehicles. Under section 210 the EPA Administrator is authorized 
to make grants to the states totalling two-thirds of the costs of 
"developing and maintaining effective vehicle emission devices 
and systems inspection and emission testing and control pro-
grams." But under a similar provision in the 1967 Act,254 not one 
state applied for the two-thirds grant for developing an inspec-
tion program, and only New Jersey, under other provisions of the 
1967 Act, applied for and received a demonstration grant to sup-
port the development of emission testing procedures suitable for 
inspection programs.266 Clearly, the states must move quickly to 
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implement inspection and enforcement programs to control grow-
ing air pollution from used vehicles. The problem is that some 
states do not yet even have an agency formed to qualify for a 
federal grant, and some of those which have agencies lack the 
expertise either to test control devices or to establish emission 
standards for used vehicles. Some states will have difficulty in 
affording even the one-third of the total cost of implementing an 
enforcement program.256 Such states should be granted additional 
federal expertise and financial assistance, as needed. There are 
presently over one hundred million used motor vehicles on the 
highways, and this number increases a rate of eight to nine mil-
lion annually.257 Only a small percentage of these, those built after 
1968, have any control at all, and these controls have proved 
highly ineffective.258 Used vehicles continue to endanger health; 
and at present neither federal nor state governments, except 
California, have begun to deal effectively, or at all, with this 
problem. 
5. Sanctions for Non-Compliance 
a. Injunctions. Under section 204 of the 1967 Act, which was 
unchanged by the 1970 Act, the district courts of the United 
States are given jurisdiction to enjoin any violations of automo-
bile emission standards. According to this section, only the fed-
eral government can bring an action to enjoin violations.259 Only 
one such action was ever initiated under the 1967 Act, a proceed-
ing to obtain a permanent injunction against the illegal importa-
tion of new motor vehicles.260 
b. Penalties. Any person261 who violates any of the automobile 
pollution provisions of the 1970 Act will be subject to a civil 
penalty of $10,000 for each violation.262 Each motor vehicle or 
engine failing to comply with the standards will constitute a sep-
arate offense.263 The penalty has been increased from $1,000 under 
the 1967 Act to $10,000 under the 1970 Act.2t\4 Although desirable, 
it is questionable whether such an increase is meaningful, especi-
ally in view of the fact that no penalties were levied at $1,000 un-
der the 1967 Act. The most effective penalty would be prohibition 
by the EPA Administrator and the states of the sale or other in-
troduction into commerce of any product which causes air pollu-
tion, if that product fails to comply with the established standards. 
Manufacturers would respond more quickly to the possibility of 
losing their market completely. The EPA Administrator is auth-
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orized to withdraw approval of new vehicles if testing demon-
strates that they fail to comply, or fail to continue to comply, with 
the federal emission standards. Revocation of such approval 
should be accompanied by an order prohibiting the introduction 
of such vehicle or device into commerce. This provision, if fully 
implemented, would provide the most effective sanction. Mone-
tary penalties are unsatisfactory because by the time such penal-
ties are imposed, the pollution damage has already been done. 
Arguably, the purpose of adequate sanctions is the deterrence of 
air pollution practices, and not the raising of revenue. Prohibition 
of the entry of the offending vehicles into the stream of commerce 
is clearly the more effective deterrent. 
c. Citizen Suits. Throughout the 1970 Act Congress has care-
fully preserved the right of the public to participate at each step 
of the air pollution abatement process:265 at the establishment of 
standards stage;266 at the implementation of control programs 
stage;267 and at the enforcement stage.268 In another controversial 
provision of the 1970 Act, the Congress, has authorized private 
citizens to bring suits on their own behalf in the U. S. district 
courts to force compliance with air quality and emission standards 
and regulations. 269 The Departmen t of HEW and other federal 
agencies encouraged private and class actions to aid their enforce-
ment efforts under the 1967 Act.270 Both the Senate Hearings and 
the Senate Committee Report make it clear that citizen suits un-
der the 1970 Act are limited to actions for injunctive relief, and 
that damages for injury to person or property are not recoverable 
under the citizen suits provision.271 Provision is made for actions 
against the polluter or government agencies (including the EPA) 
or both.272 
The significant elements of this important provision include 
the following: 
1. The federal district courts have original jurisdiction to enforce air 
pollution laws regardless of the financial amount in controversy or 
the citizenship of the parties involved.273 
2. Civil actions to require enforcement of the pollution laws may be 
brought by one or more persons on their own behalf against any 
person, governmental agency, or the EPA Administrator to com-
pel enforcement of the standards, orders or duties established 
under the 1970 Act. Including governmental agencies within the 
class of persons to be sued indicates that neither the agencies nor 
the EPA Administrator can invoke the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity, often a fatal impediment to compelling governmental 
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agencies to act. Section 304 does not, however, provide for class 
actions.274 
3. Prior notice of the suit must be served upon (a) the EPA Ad-
ministrator; (b) the state agency involved; and (c) the alleged 
viola tor. 276 
4. The courts may award costs of litigation, including reasonable 
attorney and expert witness fees, to either party.276 
The citizen suits provision unfortunately lacks a number of im-
portant elements which should have been included. Most signifi-
cant among these omissions was the failure to provide for recovery 
of damages by plaintiffs. Relief is restricted to court orders re-
quiring compliance with the established standards. This means 
that a plaintiff may not be awarded financial relief for injury done 
to his property or person; nor does section 304 permit the award-
ing of "clean-up costs" following a destructive pollution violation. 
It is submitted that the failure to allow recovery of damages un-
der section 304 weakens the citizen suits provision. Ideally, both 
injunctive relief and private damages should be available both to 
deter prospective polluters and to provide a broad range of avail-
able sanctions.277 Under the 1970 Act the plaintiff no longer has 
to prove that the emissions in question are of such a magnitude as 
to constitute a nuisance in the technical, legal sense in order to ob-
tain injunctive relief.278 Now, he need only show a violation of the 
emission standards, a considerably easier task.279 Further, the 
mere compliance with federal standards should not preclude the 
recovery of damages by an injured plaintiff. Compliance under 
certain circumstances may, nonetheless, constitute negligence, 
and such situations should be subject to jury appraisal to deter-
mine whether the person responsible for "legal," but nonetheless 
damaging, emissions has acted reasonably under the circum-
stances.280 
It became evident during the Senate Hearings that government 
agencies had been dilatory in seeking enforcement under the 1967 
Act. A major defense of those agencies, including the Department 
of HEW/81 had been that they lacked adequate funds and staff 
to police and regulate effectively the industries involved. Citizen 
suits will complement the enforcement power of the government 
agencies. There is ample precedent for private action as a supple-
ment to enforcement of federal regulatory statutes. The fields of 
antitrust litigation and securities frauds afford two examples. In 
both of these areas, Congress and the courts have relied upon pri-
vate suits to aid enforcement, due to the fact that both the De-
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partment of Justice and the Securities Exchange Commission are 
understaffed and unable to bring all the suits necessary to enforce 
the regulatory laws.282 The enforcement of air pollution laws will 
benefit no less from private citizen actions. 
6. Provisions jor Appea/283 
In the event that the automobile industry cannot sufficiently 
improve the internal combustion engine to meet the 1975 emission 
standards, Congress has provided a "realistic escape hatch" :284 
the industry may petition the EPA Administrator for a one-year 
extension of the 1975 deadline.285 The procedure for obtaining the 
extension is as follows: the manufacturer must petition the EPA 
Administrator at any time after January 1, 1972, for a suspension 
of the emission standard regulating carbon monoxide and hydro-
carbons; and after January 1, 1973, for a suspension of the nitro-
gen oxide standard.286 The EPA Administrator must then hold a 
public hearing on the request and may permit interested citizens 
to intervene.287 The filing of an appeal should not stay the in-
dustry's responsibility of complying with the standards. The Ad-
ministrator must act upon the petition within sixty days from re-
ceipt.288 He is authorized to grant the extension only upon a find-
ing that: 
1. The extension is "essential to the public interest or the public 
health and welfare of the United States;"289 
2. The manufacturers have made a good faith effort to meet the 
deadline;290 
3. The manufacturers have established that effective technology was 
not available in time to achieve compliance;291 and 
4. The study and investigation of the National Academy of Sciences 
has not indicated that technology, processes, or other alternatives 
are available to meet the standards.292 
If the Administrator grants the one-year extension, he must also 
promulgate interim emission standards which reflect the greatest 
degree of control achievable under the technology existing at that 
time.293 The Senate version of section 202 had provided that the 
Administrator's decision granting or denying the one, one-year 
extension could be appealed to the u.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia and then to the United States Supreme 
Court if certiorari were gran ted. Bu t the House-Sena te Conference 
Committee deleted the provision for judicial review of the Ad-
ministrator's decision. This means that under the Act as passed, 
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environmental citizen groups are not expressly granted standing 
to obtain federal court review of the decision granting the exten-
sion. Similarly, in the unlikely event that the Administrator de-
nies the one-year extension, the automobile industry is also not 
expressly accorded standing to seek judicial review of that deci-
sion. It is possible, however, that either group might be able to 
obtain review under the provisions of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.294 
Much Senate debate surrounded the question of who should 
have the power to review the Administrator's decision.295 It was 
recognized that" ... this may be the biggest industrial judgment 
that has been made in the United States in this century."296 This 
recognition was combined with the admission that congressional 
enactment of specific standards into law is itself without prece-
dent.297 The urgency of the air pollution problem was cited as the 
reason for the Congress so acting. But the debate was most heated 
as the Senate considered an amendment, ultimately defeated, 
which would have substituted congressional review for judicial 
review.298 Actually, Congress considered all three branches of the 
governmen t for possi ble powers of review: (1) adminis tra ti ve re-
view, by the executive branch (i.e., the Administrator's decision 
would be final with no further review); (2) congressional review; 
and (3) judicial review.299 
The major arguments against judicial review, and in favor of 
congressional review, centered upon con ten tions that: 
1. The Congress made this difficult policy decision concerning the 
automobile industry, and the Congress should take responsibility 
for reviewing its propriety.30o 
2. If Congress were to make the decision as to the one-year extension 
it could act within sixty days-thus avoiding delays of up to two 
years if the matter were litigated in the courtS.30l 
3. Congress was leaving too many policy decisions to thejudiciary.302 
4. Although the judiciary is less susceptible to political and economic 
pressures, it is pressued by an increasing backlog of cases and 
should be spared a difficult and time-consuming decision such as 
the one concerning the one-year extension.303 
5. The question of granting or denying the extension is a question of 
fact involving complex technological considerations. The courts 
are ill-equipped to deal with the difficult technical questions pre-
sented. If Congress had the power to review, it would have the full 
benefit of all the scientific background developed by federal agen-
cies expert in the technological questions presented.304 
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The arguments made in favor of judicial review, on the other 
hand, were considerably more compelling: 
1. If the industry is not able to achieve compliance with the emission 
standards, the question will be one of fact: whether the automo-
bile industry has put forth good faith efforts to meet the emission 
standards, and whether it was possible within the state of the art 
to produce a complying vehicle. Questions of fact would best be 
tried by the judiciary, rather than by 535 legislators.30s 
2. The court has the power of subpoena, of discovery and of calling 
expert wi tnesses. 306 
3. The emotion and pressure if the industry has not produced a com-
plying vehicle could be extraordinary. The courts are by design 
and tradition less subject to political and emotional pressure than 
the Congress.307 
4. There has traditionally been a right to judicial review of adminis-
trative decisions in the area of pollution contro1.308 
5. Without provision for judicial review, the industry would have a 
clear argument of denial of due process. The courts would most 
likely grant judicial review anyway, and the review would not be 
limited to the statutory jurisdiction for review of the one-year 
extension.309 
There was little support in the Senate for leaving the decision 
concerning the one-year extension solely in the hands of the Ad-
ministrator, without review by either the judiciary or the Con-
gress; the reasons for the elimination of the judicial review provi-
sion were not made clear by the House-Senate Conference Re-
port,310 which is silent on this point. It is submitted that the elim-
ination of the provision allowing for judicial review of the Ad-
ministrator's decision was unwise. The public should be entitled 
to be heard in the courts regarding a matter so important to its 
health. 
Clearly the decision of the Administrator should be subject to 
review, and the best forum for such review is the federal courts, 
for the reasons indicated above.3ll Recent cases suggest that even 
in matters committed by statute to administrative discretion, it 
rna y nonetheless be possi ble to 0 btain judicial review. 312 Indeed, in 
one recent case the court commented that preclusion of judicial 
review "is not lightly to be inferred ... it requires a showing of 
clear evidence of legislative intent."313 The courts have granted 
standing to obtain such review to those being regulated as well as 
to persons who seek "to protect the public interest in the proper 
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administration of a regulatory system enacted for their bene-
fit."314 The Senate Committee Report accompanying the Senate 
version of the 1970 Act clearly indicated that "precluding review 
does not appear to be warranted or desirable,"315 and for this rea-
son the Senate Committee included judicial review in its version 
of the bill. It would seem that, notwithstanding the deletion of the 
judicial review provision from the final version of the 1970 Act, 
judicial review with respect to the granting or denial of the one-
year extension should still be available, since Congress did hot 
substitute a specific provision evidencing a "clear legislative in-
tent" to preclude such judicial review. 
If the automobile industry still has not achieved conformity 
with the federal standards even after the one-year extension, the 
automobile manufacturers would have to petition the Congress for 
relief from the emission standards established under section 
202(b).316 If the Congress refuses to grant relief, the automakers 
would presumably resort to the courts to attack the constitution-
ality of the section 202(b) emission standards.317 If the automobile 
industry ap'peals to Congress for relief, the latter could act in any 
of several ways: 
1. Congress could order the internal combustion engine off the mar-
ket and require the use of an alternative propulsion system, not-
withstanding questions of impracticality or economy.318 
2. Congress could relax the section 202(b) emission standards and 
adjust them to comport with the state of the art or technology in 
1975. 
3. Congress could impose strict horsepower limitations upon ve-
hicles-perhaps designating a maximum of 120 horsepower on 
non-commercial new vehicles, or similar limitations on the various 
classes of new motor vehicles. Lower horsepower means lower 
octane gasoline, less combustion of gasoline and less automotive 
air pollution.319 
4. Congress could reduce the number of vehicles on the highways 
through the commerce power-by legislating a "one vehicle to one 
family" standard or similar measures, while concurrently pra-
viding for massive expansion of public transportation systems. 
All of the foregoing, with the exception of the second, calling for 
a readjustment of the emission standards to comport with avail-
able technology, may give rise to constitutional challenges by 
either the automobile industry or the motoring public.320 But 
some action will have to be taken by 1975 or 1976, if the auto-
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mobile industry loses its gamble with modifying the internal com-
bustion engine to meet the prescribed emission standards, and if 
the nation's health is to be protected. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AUTOMOBILE 
POLLUTION EMISSION STANDARDS 
A. The Economic Issues Raised 
The philosophy of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 has been 
made clear: industry protestations of technological impossibility 
or unfeasibility are no longer sufficient to avoid tough anti-air 
pollution standards and deadlines.321 In reporting to the Congress 
on the 1967 Act, the Senate Committee on Public Works enunci-
ated the rationale underlying tough air pollution laws, economic 
considera tions notwithstanding: 
The Committee recognizes the potential economic impact, and 
therefore economic risk, associated with major social legislative mea-
sures of this type. But this risk was assumed when the Congress en-
acted social security, fair labor standards, and a host of other legisla-
tion designed to protect the public welfare. Such a risk must again be 
assumed if the nation's air resources are to be conserved and en-
hanced to the point that generations yet to come will be able to 
breathe without fear of impairment of health.322 
But the 1967 Act turned out to be no risk at all. 323 The 1970 Act, 
however, if properly implemented, could bear out the rationale of 
the foregoing statement, and economic repercussions could be felt 
around the world if the automobile industry cannot produce a 
complying vehicle by 1976. 
As the only major opponent to the 1975 automobile emission 
standards, Senator Griffin of Michigan, argued the automakers' 
economic response to the tight controls: 
1. The availability of automotive transportation is a basic factor in 
the personal economy and way of life of the very people sought to 
be protected. The manufacture, sale, and servicing of motor ve-
hicles is a vital industry in the U. S. economy.324 
2. This vital industry is to be required by statute to meet standards 
which cannot be met with existing technology. Further, these 
standards were established by the Committee without benefit of 
hearings as to whether they could be met.326 
3. Over 800,000 Americans are directly dependent upon the auto in-
dustry for their livelihoods; more than 14 million jobs are depen-
dent upon its products-28 percent of all non-farm employment in 
the United States.326 
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4. Automobiles and trucks generate 10 percent of all taxes collected 
by federal, state, and local governments combined-16 percent of 
the gross national product. Even a slight dip in auto sales sends 
shock waves through the financial community.a27 
5. The Act demands that the industry make within 18 to 30 months 
a technological breakthrough which has withstood more than 15 
years of research.a28 
6. "In short ... this bill holds a gun at the head of the American au-
tomobile industry in a very dangerous game of economic rou-
lette. "a29 
The industry's prophecies of economic doom are without merit. 
Congress has mandated that the automobile's endangerment of 
the public health must be terminated. Various procedural safe-
guards in the 1970 Act guarantee that if the industry makes a 
good faith effort, but cannot technologically comply with the 
standards established in the Act, it can seek relief from Congress 
or the judiciary.aao But it must try, for the sake of everyone's 
health, to improve an instrumentality clearly dangerous to the 
public health. It seems incongruous for the automobile industry 
to argue economics versus health, when the nation's economy 
ultimately depends upon the health, and the existence, of the buy-
ing public. The problem of air pollution has assumed such an ur-
gency that no economic argument should stand as an obstacle to 
purifying our air. 
In measuring the congressional power to protect the health and 
welfare of the public, former Department of HEW Secretary 
Arthur S. Flemming cautioned: 
[T]here is one thing that a responsible government cannot do. It 
cannot fail to place at the top of its list of priorities the health of all 
the people even though by so doing, it may be or may appear to be 
acting against the economic interests of a segment of our society.aa l 
The overriding objective sought to be accomplished by Congress 
throughout the 1970 Act is the protection of the health of the 
consuming public. The public health must be considered ab initio, 
for "the economic viability of a dead community would not mean 
much."aa2 
B. The Legal Issues Raised 
The Administrator of the EPA is authorized to withhold certi-
fication of new motor vehicles which fail to comply with fed-
erally established emission standards, and to prohibit their entry 
into commerce until they comply.333 If the internal combustion 
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engine is not modified to comply with the standards set for 1975, 
those standards could operate to prohibit its further use. Strictly 
speaking, the prohibition of the further entry into commerce, or 
the sale or use of internal combustion engines is more than an 
emission regulation. It is arguably a regulation of the sale of en-
gines and, concomitantly, of the sale of motor vehicles them-
selves.334 If the Administrator must, in fact, find it necessary to 
use the drastic tool of total exclusion of the internal combustion 
engine, two questions arise: (1) upon what power can Congress 
sustain the constitutionality of section 202(b), the emission stan-
dards provision, and (2) to what constitutional attacks from the 
automobile industry is this provision susceptible? 
The congressional power to control automobile air pollution 
arises out of the commerce clause.336 Because the automobile is 
engaged in interstate transportation, is using interstate highways, 
and causes air pollution which, arguably, is itself moving in "in-
terstate commerce,"336 automobile pollution was considered to be 
properly within the ambit of congressional regulatory power. In 
United States v. Bishop Processing CO.,337 a federal district courtre-
cently held that the 1967 Clean Air Act represented a constitu-
tional exercise of the congressional commerce power since the 
movement of air pollution across state lines constituted interstate 
commerce subject to regulation by Congress.338 The court found 
that an economic relationship exists between the Clean Air Act's 
regulation of interstate air pollution and the protection of com-
merce since "malodorous pollution which 'adversely affects busi-
ness conditions and property values and impedes industrial de-
velopment' would clearly interfere with interstate commerce."339 
It has long been held that the power to regulate commerce in-
cludes the power to prohibit it entirely.34o The United States Su-
preme Court has held that Congress can "regulate interstate com-
merce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of such 
commerce as an agency to promote ... the spread of any evil or 
harm to the people of other States from the state of origin."341 
The regulation of air pollution, which has been medically shown 
to be deleterious, if not destructive, to health, is clearly within the 
commerce power of Congress. 
But the principal issue which could confront the United States 
Supreme Court sometime in 1975 or 1976 is whether the Congress 
has exceeded its commerce power in enacting section 202(b), the 
automobile emission standards provision of the 1970 Act. In past 
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cases involving control of pollution, the Court has dealt only with 
suits requiring local businesses, not an entire industry, to comply 
with existing and not future technology. However, section 202(b) 
at the 1970 Act requires that the entire automobile industry com-
ply with technology which does not presently exist. As a result, 
the Supreme Court could be expected to be reluctant to enforce 
an "impossible" standard, if the automobile industry can success-
fully demonstrate that it was willing and technologically able to 
meet the standards originally projected for 1975 by the Secretary 
of HEW under the 1967 Act,342 but that it absolutely cannot de-
velop the technology necessary to meet the standards set under 
the 1970 Act for 1975. If Congress compelled the auto industry to 
cease use of the internal combustion engine, would such action be 
too "drastic" and unreasonable ?343 The Court has never before 
had to render a decision with economic repercussions as massive 
as are possible in this case.344 Thus, the auto industry might be 
expected to attack the 1970 Act on the grounds that Congress, in 
enacting such stringent standards, exceeded its commerce power. 
The automakers could proffer several constitutional arguments, 
predicated upon both conventional notions of due process and the 
doctrine of "inverse condemnation." 
1. Due Process 
Industry arguments that Congress violated the Fifth Amend-
ment requirement of due process in enacting section 202 (b) might 
focus upon either of the following contentions: (a) that the pro-
cedure followed by Congress in enacting this provision violated 
legislative or law-making due process; and (b) that the provision 
itself is violative of due process, because the emission standards 
are impossible of achievement within the prescribed time limit. 
The jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court to adjudicate 
the question of congressional legislative due process was reiterated 
in the recent case of Powell v. McCormack. 345 In that case the 
Court declared: 
Especially is it competent and proper for [the Supreme Court] to con-
sider whether [congressional] proceedings are in conformity with the 
Constitution and laws, because, living under a written constitution, 
no branch or department of the government is supreme; and it is the 
province and duty of the judicial department to determine ... 
whether the powers of any branch of the government, and even those 
of the legislature in the enactment of laws, have been exercised in 
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conformity to the Constitution; and if they have not, to treat their 
acts as null and void.346 
For Congress to establish precise standards without first holding 
hearings to ascertain whether such standards are achievable is re-
portedly without precedent.347 No administrative agency may set 
standards or regulations without first holding public hearings at 
which all interested parties, including those to be regulated, may 
testify. In fact, the 1970 Act requires that every other standard or 
regulation which the EPA Administrator must establish may be 
formulated only after public hearings have been held. Nonethe-
less, a due process argument based upon the failure of Congress to 
hold hearings on section 202 (b) should fail. Congress determined 
that it was able to infer from all of the testimony held during both 
the lengthy 1970 Hearings, and the 1967 Hearings, that the stan-
dards established under section 202(b) were realistic and achiev-
able. The Senate Committee reported that specific hearings on 
this provision were not necessary;348 that the urgency of the air 
pollution problem required that technology be pushed forward by 
such emission requirements. 349 
There is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of a con-
gressional enactment, and the burden of proving its unconstitu-
tionality is an extremely formidable one.350 The burden would be 
upon the automakers to establish that facts sufficient to justify 
the strict emission standards did not exist.361 This effectively 
means proving that: (a) if the Senate Committee had held hear-
ings, the facts needed to justify the strict emission standards 
would not have been found; (b) the 202(b) standards are more 
severe than air pollution problem requires; and (c) the 202(b) 
standards are impossible to achieve within the allotted time pe-
riod. The thrust of proving the foregoing would be the con ten tion 
that in legislating without giving the industry a chance to be 
heard, Congress acted arbitrarily and went beyond necessary and 
reasonable bounds to accomplish its objective of controlling air 
pollution. But when the legislative purpose intended is the protec-
tion of the public health and welfare, and Congress bases its ac-
tion upon what it considers to be quantitatively sufficient proof 
that such strict standards are urgently needed, the presumption 
of the constitutionality of legislation should prevail, absent a 
showing of clear congressional error.362 Congress has complete 
power to determine the procedure through which it will find facts, 
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and to enact necessary laws based upon its findings. It is sub-
mitted that an attack on the 1970 Act based upon congressional 
violation of law-making due process must fail. 
The second foreseeable due process attack on section 202(b) 
would be predicated upon the argument that even if Congress did 
not violate law-making due process, the emission standards them-
selves are arbitrary, unreasonable, and lack a rational relationship 
to the purpose intended.353 Clearly, the legislative purpose in-
herent in the automobile provisions of the 1970 Act is the protec-
tion of the public health. Congress has determined that urgency 
requires the severe emission standards established in section 202 
(b). The burden is again upon the automakers to rebut the strong 
presumption of constitutionality inhering in the Act and to prove 
that section 202(b) is unreasonable and inappropriate.3M State 
courts have generally tended to uphold the constitutionality of 
statutes designed to protect the public health, and have been un-
willing to disturb legislative determinations unless they are 
clearly arbitrary.355 The rationale in these cases is sound: if the 
statute is designed to protect the public health, and if the means 
selected are reasonably calculated to reduce air pollution, then the 
statute should be sustained even if it results in great expense to 
the person being regulated;356 or even if it causes an industry to 
cease operations entirely.357 
To bolster its argument that section 202(b) is violative of due 
process because it is arbitrary and unreasonable, the auto indus-
try might advance the "unavoidable necessity" argument.358 The 
basic thrust of this argument would be economic: that since no 
known equipment exists which can solve the automobile pollution 
situation, and since the automobile is such a vital factor in the 
economy, the necessity of fluid transportation far outweighs the 
unavoidable result, that is, emission pollution.359 A minority of 
cases has held that a business cannot be required to meet any 
standard higher than technology permits, and that shutting down 
a business entirely when technology is not available is "too dras-
tic."360 But it is submitted that this argument should also fail. 
Section 202(b) compels not the shutdown of the automobile in-
dustry, but rather the use of alternative propulsion systems, now 
known to exist,361 if the internal combustion engine cannot be 
purified by 1975. Historically, the courts have rejected economic 
arguments when dealing with air pollution legislation. Courts 
have enjoined stationary-source polluters even where it appeared 
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that such an injunction would result in a total shutdown of the 
business. Such a decision was recently passed down by the New 
Jersey Superior Court: 
The applicability of the [unavoidable necessity] doctrine turns upon 
the reasonableness of the statue or regulation under review and of the 
proscription imposed. Assuredly, it is not unreasonable for the State, 
in the interest of the public health and welfare, to seek to control air 
pollution. Even if this means the shutting down of an operation harm-
ful to health or unreasonably interfering with life or property, the 
statute must prevai1.362 
The touchstone of the due process determination is whether the 
statute or provision in question is arbitrary or unreasonable. Even 
here the Supreme Court has been reluctant to interfere with legis-
lative findings. In Sproles v. Binford/63 the Supreme Court stated 
that "debatable questions as to reasonableness are not for the 
courts but for the legislature." But if the Court must determine 
whether a law is arbitrary or unreasonable, what guidelines will it 
follow? The Court has stated that it will look to the nature of the 
menace against which the law operates, the availability and ef-
fectiveness of other, less drastic protective steps, and the loss 
suffered by the imposition of the statute.364 It must be concluded 
that section 202(b) is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, in view 
of the fact that without such strict emission standards, the objec-
tive of Congress to protect the public health would be frustrated. 
2. Inverse Condemnation365 
The Fifth Amendment declares that the federal government 
may not take private property for public use without just com-
pensation. If Congress prohibits the automobile industry from 
further use of the internal combustion engine the question arises 
whether such action would qualify as a "taking" in the constitu-
tional sense. The automobile industry might argue that the emis-
sion standards in section 202(b) are not regulatory but are com-
pletely prohibitory; and that the prohibition of the further use of 
the internal combustion engine amounts to a confiscation of prop-
erty without just compensation. This argument would embody 
the theory of "inverse condemnation" which has been used by 
industry in the past to attack governmental statutes and regula-
tions. 366 The Supreme Court has previously had occasion to review 
governmental actions which resulted in considerable economic 
losses to private property owners, and has generally held that 
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federal or state governments are not obligated to compensate the 
owners for these losses.367 When a governmen t has had to pay 
compensation, the rationale has been that the government should 
be barred "from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as 
a whole."368 The traditional "burden" which the public has been 
asked to share in these cases has been an economic one, so that 
the private property owner would not unjustly be deprived of his 
assets. The central issue in the "taking" cases has been the de-
termination by the court of whether the action taken by the gov-
ernment was a compensable taking or merely a "consequential 
destruction" and hence not compensable. In Armstrong v. United 
States,369 the Court discussed the difficulty of making such a de-
termination: 
It is true that not every destruction or injury to property by gov-
ernmental action has been held to be a "taking" in the constitutional 
sense. This [cited] case and many others reveal the difficulty of trying 
to draw the line between what destructions of property by lawful 
governmental actions are compensable "taking" and what destruc-
tions are "consequential" and therefore not compensable.370 
The result, decisionally, has been a lack of order and an ad hoc 
treatment of confiscation cases.371 In United States v. Caltex (Phil-
lipines), Inc., the Supreme Court stated that "[nJo rigid rules can 
be laid down to distinguish compensable losses from non-compen-
sable losses."372 Generally the courts have permitted the govern-
mental use of police power, without imposing liability to com-
pensate, in situations where the public necessity demands that an 
impending peril be immediately averted.373 In such cases, the 
urgency of the situation constitutes full justification for the mea-
sures taken to abate the menacing condition.374 At common law, 
courts generally upheld the validity of such uncompensated 
abatement actions as incident to the police power to eliminate 
"public nuisances" or situations deemed inimical to the public 
welfare.375 By statue, the federal and state governments now 
authorize the seizure, forfeiture, or outright destruction of private 
prQperty as necessary to enforce legislatively determined regu-
latory policies.376 The use of uncompensated confiscation or de-
struction of private property as a means of enforcing regulatory 
policies has been sustained repeatedly as being within constitu-
tionallimitations.377 The power to enact the underlying regula-
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tory policy has been held to include the power to enforce that 
policy by all rational means available, including the destruction 
of property rights. In Mugler v. Kansas,378 an early case dealing 
with a state statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of 
intoxicating liquors within state boundaries, the Supreme Court 
held that: 
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are 
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or 
safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a tak-
ing or an appropriation of property for the public benefit .... The 
power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of 
their property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals or the 
safety of the public, ... cannot be burdened with the condition that 
the State must compensate such individual owners for the pecuniary 
losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a 
noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community.379 
The weaknesses in advancing the argument that section 202(b) 
results in a "taking for public use," which is therefore compen-
sable, are several. Initially, the automobile industry must estab-
lish that federal prohibition of a type of engine, not all types of 
engines, qualifies as a "destruction" of property, or a "taking" 
of property for public "use." Serious doubt exists as to whether 
such federal regulation is a confiscation at all. The Congress, in 
section 202(b), has legislated strict controls in order that the 
public not be denied one of its most basic natural rights, the 
right to breathe healthful, clean air. If there exists an infringe-
ment of property rights, or a potential destruction of values, it 
would appear that the automobile industry, absent the necessary 
federal controls placed on the air pollution it causes, would be 
the party doing the confiscating. Automotive air pollution un-
questionably "takes" clean air from the public. If prohibiting the 
use of a type of engine, as opposed to shutting down the auto-
mobile industry, were to be considered a "taking for public use," 
the concept of "use" would assume a meaning certainly not 
intended by the framers of the Constitution. To reach such a 
result, the term "use" would have to be interpreted as including 
prevention oj jorced use by the public of an instrumentality in-
jurious to its health-a nuisance. That government can prohibit 
the proliferation of a nuisance is too well established in the 
common law to admit dispute. The public has the right to be 
protected from having to use a vehicle which, although con-
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venient and economically attractive, is highly dangerous as 
compared to alternatives that might be, if the automakers pro-
duced other types of engines, more expensive, but less noxious. 
At present, the public has no choice but to purchase vehicles 
propelled by the internal combustion engine, if private transpor-
tation is desired. Without federal stimulus in the form of strict 
emission standards in the 1970 Act, and heavy government fund-
ing for research to develop alternatives, the automobile industry 
would be permitted to continue compelling the public to use 
only the hazardous internal combustion engine. In his famous 
dissent in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,380 Justice Brandeis 
issued a sound doctrinal basis for determining the definitional 
limits of "takings": 
[U]ses, once harmless, may, owing to changed conditions, seriously 
threaten the public welfare. Whenever they do, the legislature has 
power to prohibit such uses without paying compensation; and the 
power to prohibit extends alike to the manner, the character, and the 
purpose of the use .... 
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise 
of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore en-
joyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the state of rights in 
property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to 
protect the public health, safety, or morals, from dangers threatened 
is not a taking .... The State does not appropriate it or make any use 
of it. The State merely prevents the owner from making a use which 
interferes with paramount rights of the public.3sl 
The Congress has determined in the 1970 Clean Air Amend-
ments that the automakers must reduce pollution emissions to 
the prescribed 1975 levels. It has determined that a state of 
urgency exists which imperils the public health, and that the 
regulation of automobile emissions, and not the prohibition of 
all types of automobile engines, is highly necessary. The industry 
is given the latitude to choose how it will achieve the 1975 
standards. It has apparently chosen to gamble on improving the 
internal combustion engine rather than developing alternatives 
with all deliberate speed. Such a choice cannot be deemed a 
"taking" by the federal government, and a constitutional attack 
on the 1970 Act based upon the theory of "confiscation without 
compensation" would be spurious. Rather, the government's 
action in enacting section 202(b) requires the automobile in-
dustry to conduct its business, the manufacture of motor vehi-
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cles, in such a way as not to infringe upon the paramount right 
of the public to enjoy clean air. If the public, through federal 
compensation, were to subsidize the automobile industry for the 
removal of an instrumentality dangerous to its health, the ironic 
consequence would be that the public would be paying for its 
right to breathe clean air. 
CONCLUSION 
The need to improve the quality of the air we breathe has been 
made increasingly apparent by the proliferating and tragic air 
pollution incidents of the past several years. The unparalleled 
economic growth in the nation has not occurred without an at-
tendant toll upon our environment. Through the combined 
effects of stationary source pollution and motor vehicle air 
pollution, industry pours almost two hundred million tons of 
contaminants into the air annually. In parts of the nation, the 
air has already deteriorated to a point where school children are 
not able to go outdoors for physical education on days when air 
pollution reaches critical levels.382 Only in recent years has 
Congress seriously addressed itself to the urgency of the menac-
ing problem of air contamination. Unfortunately, the short 
history of federal air pollution legislation has been marked by 
weak laws, which have been un aggressively and ineffectively 
implemented by the various levels of government. The 1967 Air 
Quality Act, a slight improvement over previous federal regu-
latory efforts, was emasculated both by the failure of Congress to 
appropriate the funds and manpower necessary for its successful 
implementation, and by the failure of the Department of HEW 
to enforce it adequately. 
Motor vehicles, particularly used automobiles, continue to be 
the largest single source of air pollution and, concomitantly, the 
most serious hazard to the public health. Congress has recog-
nized that vehicular air pollution absolutely must be reduced to 
medically safe levels, and that the limitations of present tech-
nology should not prevent the achievement of this goal. In en-
acting section 202(b) of the 1970 Act, the stringent vehicular 
emission standards for new motor vehicles, Congress challenged 
the automobile industry either to stop poisoning the air by 
sufficiently improving the internal combustion engine to meet 
the 1975 emission standards, or else, economic costs notwith-
standing, to stop marketing that type of engine. 
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The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 demonstrate the increased 
federal commitment to the abatement of air pollution. This Act 
provides greater financial support for state control and research 
programs, stringent minimum federal standards for stationary 
and particularly for moving source pollution; increased federal 
enforcement power and direct federal enforcement assistance in 
state control programs; stiffer sanctions for violators; and a new 
federally created right of enforcement through citizen suits. But 
the experience of prior federal air pollution legislation indicates 
that the mere enactment of a new stringent law will not produce 
meaningful results in the attack on air pollution. If the struggle 
is to be successful, there must be a united effort on the part of all 
levels of government: federal, state, and local; on the part of 
industry, complying with the health protection standards; and 
on the part of individual citizens, who must police their own 
practices, as well as those of industry and those of the govern-
mental agencies charged with the responsibility for effective 
administration of the anti-pollution laws. 
One hundred years ago, the first board of health in the United 
States, organized in Massachusetts, declared that: 
We believe that all citizens have an inherent right to the enjoyment 
of pure and uncontaminated air and water and soil, that this right 
should be regarded as belonging to the whole community and that no 
one should be allowed to trespass upon it by his carelessness and his 
avarice, or even by his ignorance.383 
In enacting the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, the Congress has 
taken the first important step to protect that right. The next 
vital step will be the full and effective implementation of the 
Act by the government and the citizens. The 1970 Act will be a 
significant contribution to the air pollution abatement effort 
only if it can avoid the evisceration which has plagued its prede-
cessors. 
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quately implemented. Yet, as of May 1, 1970, NAPCA had only 971 
staff members. 116 Congo Rec.16,214 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). The 
1970 HEW report to the Congress, entitled "Manpower and Training 
Needs for Air Pollution Control," indicated that most state air pollution 
control agencies are also understaffed. Recruitment of competent 
personnel is difficult. The biggest problem is the low compensation paid 
by state and local agencies. Typical salaries fall 20% to 50% below the 
median paid by industry for comparable positions. The HEW Report 
estimates that by 1974 state and local agencies will need 8,000 addi-
tional personnel in order to implement the Federal Act adequately-an 
increase of 300% over the number currently employed in these pro-
grams. 116 Congo Rec. 16,105 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). 
51 Indicative of this low priority status are the funding and man-
power sta tis tics set forth in notes 49 and 50 supra. 
52 See note 32 supra. In addition to failing to designate the requisite 
ninety air quality regions by July, 1970, the Department of HEW failed 
to publish within a reasonable time criteria for the five identified pol-
lutants, as required under the 1967 Act. See 42 U.S.c. §1857c-2(b) 
(Supp. V, 1970); 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 1188. In 
addition, the Secretary of HEW did not utilize the power granted to 
him under 42 U.S.c. §1875f-6c to gather information regarding fuels 
and fuel additives. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 483, 1044. 
The Secretary assessed no penalties for violations of 42 U.S.c. §1857f-2 
(Supp. V, 1970), the "Prohibited Acts" Section of the 1967 Act. 1970 
Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 380. The penalty provided was a 
$1,000 fine. See 42 U.S.C. §1875f-4. (Supp. V, 1970). The only enforce-
ment action taken by the Secretary, however, was the obtainment of a 
permanent injunction in 1969 to prevent the illegal importation of new 
motor vehicles. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 380. 
53 42 U.S.c. §1857f-5 (Supp. V, 1970). 
54 Id. 
55 Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on 
Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 167-69, 362-64, 371-72, 1226 (1970) [hereinafter cited 
as 1970 Senate Hearings]. 
56 See text accompanying 27 supra. 
67 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 55, at 363. 
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68Id. at 372. The language in the 1970 Act's version of the auto in-
spection provision, and that of the Senate Committee Report and 
House-Senate Conference Report, clarify the inspection power to re-
quire assembly line testing of individual vehicles. Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1970 §206; S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 
(1970); Conference Report, H.R. Rep. No. 91-1783, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 50-51 (1970). 
59 42 U.S.C. §1857d(c)(4)(ii) (Supp. V, 1970). 
60 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 55, 389. The states appear re-
luctant to request such assistance even in the face of strong citizen 
pressure to do so. For example, the citizens of West Virginia made 
numerous appeals to their Governor to request aid in abating pollution 
allegedly caused by Union Carbide Corporation, but their pleas were 
fruitless. See West Virginians Appeal for Air Pollution Abatement, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1970, at 42, col. 1. The decision on the part of a 
state to refrain from taking action may well be influenced by political 
and economic pressure. See discussion on p. 390 infra. 
61 42 U.S.C. §1857d(k) (Supp. V, 1970). 
62Id. Fines were provided only for violations of the motor vehicle 
emissions subchapter. See 42 U.S.c. §1857f-4 (Supp. V, 1970). 
63 116 Congo Rec. 16,105 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). 
64 42 U.S.c. §1857d(c) (Supp. V, 1970); 116 Congo Rec. 16,105 
dailyed. Sept. 21, 1970). 
65 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 55, at 115. 
66 See Currie, supra note 46, at 1087. 
67 See discussion on p. 388-91 supra. 
68 For additional insight into the ineffectiveness of the 1967 Act, see 
generally O'Fallon, Deficiencies in the Air Quality Act of 1967,33 Law 
& Contemp. Prob. 275 (1968); Currie, supra note 46. 
69 42 U.S.C. §1857f-1(a) (Supp. V, 1970). 
70 116 Congo Rec. 16,091 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). 
71 Id. 
72 Senator Muskie advised the Senate that: 
Detroit has told the nation that Americans cannot live without the auto-
mobile. 
This legislation would tell Detroit that if that is the case, they must make 
an automobile with which Americans can live. 
Id. at 16,092. 
73 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 tit. IV. §15; 116 Congo Rec. 16,107 
(daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). This provision was offered as an amendment 
on the Senate floor. For discussion preceding its adoption by the Senate, 
see 116 Congo Rec. 16,217 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). The Reorganiza-
tion Plan effecting this transfer of responsibilities and powers from 
HEW to the new Environmental Protection Agency became law on 
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October 3, 1970. CCH Clean Air & Water News, No. 41, at 2 (Oct. 9, 
1970). The new agency is charged with the administration and enforce-
ment of all the federal anti-pollution programs. In September, 1970, 
there were an estimated 90 to 100 federal programs and agencies con-
cerned with environmental pollution. 49 Congo Dig. 198 (1970). Re-
organization was clearly needed to coordinate efforts and eliminate 
needless multiplication of expenses. The Department of HEW had 
grown too large and had become too burdened with other programs to 
administer the fight on pollution effectively, as illustrated by its record 
under the 1967 Act. See discussion on p. 388-90 supra. As a result of the 
Reorganization Plan, the EPA will absorb the Federal Water Quality 
Administration from the Department of the Interior; the National Air 
Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA) from the Department of 
HEW; the Pesticides Registration Authority from the Department of 
Agriculture; and numerous other smaller federal agencies. The En-
vironmental Protection Agency is not to be confused with the other 
major federal pollution agency, the Council on Environmental Quality, 
an advisory board without enforcement powers which is primarily re-
sponsible for advising the President on environmental pollution policy 
matters. Boston Globe, Nov. 7, 1970, at 38, col. 2. 
74 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §§103-05. The 1967 Act had au-
thorized appropriations of $170 million for the three-year period from 
1968 through 1970. 42 U.S.c. §1857b-1(c) (Supp. V, 1970). The 1970 
Act authorizes $350 million for research on air pollution in relation to 
fuels and low-emission alternatives to the existing internal combustion 
engine, and a total of $1.1 billion to implement the Act for the three-
year period from 1971 through 1973. Clean Air Amendments of 1970 
§§103, 104,212,316,403. Most of the funds authorized under the 1967 
Act, however, were never expended. See the statistics in notes 49 and 50 
supra. 
75Id. §104(a)(1)(B). 
76Id. §104(a)(1)(C). 
77Id. §103(f)(1)(A), (B). Section 103(f)(3) of the Act also authorizes 
the EPA to contract with private industry for research on the effects of 
air pollution, and provides $15 million for such contracts. 
78Id. §§104(a)(2)(B), (C), 212. 
79Id. §104(a)(1)(E). 
80 Section 105(a) of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 authorizes the 
EPA Administrator to provide up to two-thirds of the costs of "plan-
ning, developing, establishing or improving" and up to one-half of the 
cost of maintaining state air quality control programs serving a single 
municipality; or up to 75% of planning costs and up to 60% of the 
maintenance costs for programs serving two or more muncipalities. The 
amounts provided under the 1967 Act were 67% and 50%, respectively. 
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42 U.S.C. §1857c(a)(1) (Supp. V, 1970). Under §106 of the 1970 Act, the 
Administrator is authorized to provide one hundred percent of planning 
program costs for two years, and 75% of such costs thereafter, for the 
purpose of developing implementation plans for any interstate air 
quality control region comprised of several states. While the increased 
funds made available to the states to assist them in establishing and 
maintaining intrastate pollution control program is salutary, some less 
prosperous states will still have serious financial difficulties in establish-
ing and operating viable pollution control programs. Such states should 
receive more, if not all, of the necessary funds from Congress. Illustra-
tive of states which might be unable to establish an on-going pollution 
control program even with the aid authorized under the 1970 Act is the 
near-bankrupt state of New Hampshire. See Boston Globe, Nov. 26, 
1970, at 3, col. 5. 
81 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §107(c). 
82Id. §108(a). See discussion in note 33 and accompanying text 
supra. 
83 Id. §108(a)(2). 
84Id. §108(b). 
85 The Senate Committee Report accompanying the Senate version 
of the Act defined "ambient air quality" as follows: 
Ambient air quality is sufficient to protect the health of [particularly 
sensitive citizens such as emphysematics] whenever there is an absence of 
adverse effect on the health ... from exposure to the ambient air. An am-
bient air quality standard, therefore, should be the maximum permissible 
ambient air level of an air pollution agent or class of such agents (related to a 
period of time) which will protect the health of any group of the population. 
S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970). This decidedly 
general definition attempted to convey the basic premise that national 
standards must be such that the attainment and maintenance thereof 
would protect the health of all persons. The House-Senate Conference 
Committee, however, modified the Senate definition of an ambient air 
quality standard by dividing standards into "primary" and "secon-
dary" standards. Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §109(a). Primary 
standards are defined as those "requisite to protect the public health." 
Id. §109(b)(1). Secondary standards are those "requisite to protect the 
public welfare." Id. §109(b)(2). The Administrator is required to 
establish two standards for each pollutant, one based upon public 
health, the other upon public welfare, both of which the states must 
then implement in their control programs. The distinction between 
"public health" and "public welfare" is an economic one. Section 
302(h) of the 1970 Act indicates that: 
All language referring to effects on welfare includes, but is not limited to 
effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, man made materials, animals, wild-
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life, weather, visibility and climate damage to and deterioration of property, 
and hazards to transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on 
personal comfort and well-being. 
Primary standards must be stringent enough to protect the health of 
even the most sensitive citizens, as indicated by the quotation from the 
Senate Committee Report supra. Secondary standards, it would ap-
pear, must be even more stringent in order to protect virtually every-
thing other than public health. Presumably, one air quality standard 
for each pollutant, as stringent as technologically possible, would have 
been sufficient to protect both public health and public proprietary or 
other interests from the effects of air pollution. If the secondary stan-
dards were to be interpreted as being less stringent than the primary 
standards, and the Act were to be interpreted as allowing the states to 
enforce the secondary rather than the primary standards, then clearly 
public health considerations would be frustrated and rendered sub-
servient to proprietary considerations. But if, as is more logical, the 
secondary standards are to be tougher than the primary standards, the 
result would be the recognition that standards adequate to protect 
health may be inadequate to protect everything else. For example, a 
pollutant such as particulate matter, complying with a "public health" 
standard, could continue to be extremely destructive to animals, or 
could adversely affect weather, visibility, personal comfort, etc. For 
this type of a pollutant, then, a stricter standard than one based upon 
public health would be needed. That secondary standards are meant to 
be stricter may also be inferred from the fact that the Act allows ad-
ditional time for states to implement them. Section 110 of the Act, dis-
cussed infra, requires immediate implementation of primary standards, 
but requires that secondary standards be implemented only within "a 
reasonable time." §110(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
86 See discussion on p. 387 supra. 
87 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §108(c), (d). 
88Id. §109(a). 
89Id. §116. 
90 See disscussion on p. 390 supra. While it is lamentable, it is not sur-
prising that only ten states standards and no state implementation 
plans had been approved by HEW as oflate September, 1970. In any 
event, the states should benefit greatly by being required to adopt, as a 
minimum, the federally promulgated air quality standards. 
91 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §107(a). 
92 Section 111 of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 provides the 
EPA Administrator power to prohibit and to suspend construction and 
operation of new stationary sources of poUu tion, unless they comply 
with the pollution control standards promulgated by the EPA Adminis-
trator pursuant to §111. New stationary sources expected to be sub-
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jected to the provisions of §111 include: cement manufacturing, coal 
cleaning operations, coke by-product manufacturing, cotton ginning, 
ferro alloy plants, grain milling and handling operations, gray iron foun-
dries, iron and steel operations, nitric acid manufacturing, nonferrous 
metallurgical operations, petroleum refining, phosphate manufacturing, 
phosphoric acid manufacturing, pulp and paper mill operations, ren-
dering plants, sulfuric acid manufacturing, soap and detergent manu-
facturing, municipal incinerators and stream electric power plants. 116 
Congo Rec., 16,108 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). 
93 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §§108, 109. 
94Id. §112. This is a new section, devoted exclusively to emission 
standards for "hazardous air pollutants." Such a pollutant is one "to 
which no ambient air quality standard is applicable and which in the 
judgment of the Administrator may cause, or contribute to, an in-
crease in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitat-
ing reversible, illness." Id. §112(a)(1). In short, this refers to a type of 
pollutant so dangerous to health that the EPA Administrator, after 
appropriate procedures, may prohibit it entirely or severely restrict it. 
Pollutants expected to be subject to this section include asbestos, 
cadmium, mercury and beryllium. S. Rep. No. 96-1196, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 20 (1970). 
95 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §112 sets forth the procedures to be 
followed to control those substances which may eventually be desig-
nated "hazardous agents," discussed in note 94 supra, or subject to the 
ambient air quality standards (as carbon monoxide now is), depending 
upon the criteria report for each such substance. Included as pollutants 
under this section are arsenic, chlorine gas, hydrogen chloride, copper, 
manganese, nickel, vanadium, zinc, barium, boron, chromium, sele-
nium, pesticides and radioactive substances. S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970). 
96 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §112(d)(1). 
97Id. §§107, 110, 111. 
98 Sections 113 and 303 define the intervention powers of the Ad-
ministrator. For a discussion of federal enforcement power regarding 
intrastate and interstate pollution from stationary sources see discus-
sion on pp. 396-97 infra. 
99 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §§202, 211(c)(4), 233. The general 
federal preemption provision contained in the 1967 Act was not changed 
by the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. See 42 U.S.C. §18S7f-6a (Supp. 
V, 1970). 
100 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §110. 
101Id. §109. 
l02Id. §110(a)(1). 
103 Id. 
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104 The 1970 Senate Hearings recognized the importance and the 
right of the public to be heard at each step of the pollution abatement 
process, from establishing air quality standards and emission levels for 
pollutants, to citizens' court action to compel their enforcement. See 
the discussion of the important new citizen suits provision under the 
1970 Act on pp. 414-16 infra. 
106 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §110(a)(2). A plan submitted to 
the EPA by a state will not be approved by the Administrator unless it 
includes the following measures: provision to achieve air quality 
standards within three years from the date of implementation of the 
plan; specific emission standards for pollutants, and schedules of 
compliance; effective procedures to control pollution sources, including 
land use and air and surface transportation controls; a procedure for 
review, prior to construction or modification, of the location of new 
stationary sources of pollution; requirements for installation of monitor-
ing equipment and periodic pollution reports by owners or operators of 
stationary sources of pollution; and provision for periodic pollution 
inspection and testing of motor vehicles. I d. 
106Id. §110(c). 
107 Id. 
108Id. §110(b). 
109Id. §110(c). Under this section compliance with primary standards 
is normally required within a three-year period. The two-year extension 
will be granted to the state if the Administrator determines that: 
(A) One or more emission sources (or classes of moving sources) are unable 
to comply with the requirements of such plan which implement such primary 
standard because the necessary technology or other alternatives are not 
available or will not be available soon enough to permit compliance within 
such three year period, and 
(B) the State has considered and applied as a part of its plan reasonably 
available alternative means of attaining such primary standard and has 
justifiably concluded that attainment of such primary standard within the 
three years cannot be achieved. 
Id. §110(e)(1). 
11°Id. §116. 
111 Id. §110(a)(2)(A)(i). 
112 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §110(f). Consequently, a state 
could first obtain a two-year extension of the three-year deadline for 
compliance with primary air quality standards, established under 
§110(e), and then could obtain still another one-year extension if a 
pollution source within the state has difficulty meeting the standards. 
Accordingly, a total of six years could elapse, following the EPA Ad-
ministrator's acceptance of the state's plan, before the state would have 
to comply with its primary (public health) air quality standards. 
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113Id. §110(f)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D). 
114 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1970). 
116 The Senate version of section 110, dealing with implementation of 
control programs by the states, had provided for renewable one-year 
extensions during which a state, or more precisely, polluters in the 
state, could have procrastinated to avoid compliance with the program, 
to the detriment of the health and welfare of residents of the state. The 
inclusion of the provision allowing unlimited renewable one-year ex-
tensions was a flaw in the Senate bill which the House-Senate Con-
ference averted. But because a state can apply for a two-year extension 
of the three-year deadline at the time it submits its implementation 
plan (see note 109 supra), the states are already assured of a minimum 
five-year period during which compliance with federal air quality 
standards may be postponed. This delay period may be increased by an 
additional year if a given source of pollution within the state encounters 
difficulty in complying with federal requirements. See note 112 and 
accompanying text supra. 
116 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §110(f) (2). The court hasjurisdie-
tion to affirm or set aside the Administrator's decision in whole or in 
part.ld. 
117 A state has nine months after the Administrator promulgates pri-
mary and secondary national air quality standards to submit an im-
plementation plan to the Administrator. Id. §110(a)(1). The latter has 
four months within which to approve or disapprove the submitted 
plan.ld. §110(a) (2). At his discretion, the Administrator may grant an 
eighteen month extension for the submission of a plan which implements 
a secondary air quality standard. Id. §110(b). If the plan when 
finally submitted is not acceptable, the Administrator must give the 
state two months to revise the plan. Id. §110(c)(3). If the state fails to 
revise the plan, the Administrator is then given another six months 
after the expiration of the final date of submission to impose a plan upon 
a state. Id. Thus, thirty-nine months could elapse before a state even 
has a control program to implement. 
118 See note 112 supra. 
119 Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. 
on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1234 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Senate 
Hearings]. The ineffectiveness of the procedures calling for a pre-
liminary conference, then a public hearing, and finally resort to the 
courts is illustrated by the following example. The first air pollution en-
forcement action was instituted by the federal government in 1965 
under the 1963 Act, against a chicken processing plant in Maryland. A 
conference was held in 1965, a public hearing in 1967. Suit was finally 
brought in the federal district court in 1969, and an appeal was taken to 
the U.S. Supreme Court. The plant was not finally shut down until 
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May, 1970-5 years after the abatement action started. No other en-
forcement action has proceeded beyond the conference stage, and no 
enforcement action was ever taken under the 1967 Act. 116 Congo Rec. 
16,104 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). 
120 See discussion of p. 390 supra. 
121 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §113. 
12242 U.S.C. §1857d (Supp. V, 1970). 
123 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §113(a)(2). 
124Id. §113(a)(1). 
126Id. §113(a)(1), (b). 
126Id. §113(a)(2). Despite the fact that the Administrator is now able 
to order violators directly and to institute direct injunctive and crim-
inal proceedings, the requirement that he must wait thirty days before 
he can affirmatively abate the violation represents a weakening of a 
more effective Senate version of more immediate federal enforcement 
powers. In the Senate version of the bill, H.R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as Senate Amendments of 1970], §116 
empowered the Administrator to require that a polluter cease his 
violation with 72 hours of the issuance of his order. Also, the language 
of the Senate version was mandatory. The language in §113 of the Clean 
Air Amendments is merely discretionary. In discussing the Senate 
version, dealing with the powers of the Administrator to require abate-
ment of pollution violations within 72 hours, the Senate Committee 
Report indicated that the judgment of the Administrator should not 
even be reviewable: 
In view of the need for streamlined and expedited enforcement procedures, 
the committee intends that the judgment of the [Administrator] in this in-
stance shall not be reviewable. 
S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1970). Section 113 of the 
Act as enacted does not provide for immediate relief, and the Ad-
ministrator's order is reviewable. See discussion of appeal provisions on 
pp. 397-99 infra. Clearly the 72-hour provision is preferable, as it would 
spare the public from an added month of harmful pollution before the 
polluter must cease. But although section 113 imposes a thirty-day bar 
to administrative action, emergency powers enabling the Administrator 
to act to obtain immediate abatement of serious violations of stationary 
or moving source emission standards are available to him under §303 
of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. 
127 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §114(a)(1). 
128Id. 
129Id. §113(c)(1). 
130Id. §113(c)(2). The penalties provided under the 1970 Act are 
decidedly severe. Whether they are severe enough to deter violations, 
and whether the EPA Administrator will actually use them, remain to 
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be seen. Under the 1967 Act the Secretary of HEW had no power to 
seek penalties against stationary source polluters. Although he did have 
the power to impose penalties in the case of moving sources of pollution 
under 42 U.S.C. §1857f-4, this power was never exercised. 1970 Senate 
Hearings, supra note 119, at 380. 
131 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §304. See discussion of pp. 414-
16 infra. 
132 Discussion of the provisions for judicial review will be limi ted here 
to review of administrative standards and decisions relating to station-
ary source pollution. Judicial review in the context of automobile 
emission standards and decisions will be discussed infra, at pp. 416-20. 
133 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §307(b)(1). 
134Id. 
135Id. 
136Id. §307(a)(1). Except for emission data which is available to the 
public, the Administrator shall consider documents submitted by al-
leged polluters confidential if the latter can satisfactorily demonstrate 
to the Administrator that, if made public, the information would 
divulge trade secrets or secret processes of the owner or operator. I d. 
Failure to produce subpoenaed information would lead to a contempt of 
court citation. Id. 
137 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 
1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970), involving standards for the pesticide DDT. 
(Plaintiff's brief for this case, and discussion thereon, are found in 1970 
Senate Hearings, supra note 119, at 622-816); Barlow v. Collins, 397 
U.S. 159 (1970), involving regulations for use of farmlands under the 
Food and Agriculture Act of 1965; Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 
387 U.S. 136 (1967), involving regulations requiring the proper labeling 
of prescription drugs. 
138 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098 
(D.C. Cir. 1970). 
139 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 
1096 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970); 
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967). 
140 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 
(D.C. Cir. 1970); S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 40-42 
(1970). 
141 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §307. 
142Id. It is important to note that if any interested person fails to 
appeal any action of the Administrator regarding the establishment of 
emission standards for pollutants, or the approval of state implementa-
tion plans, within thirty days of such action, the Administrator's action 
shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings 
for enforcement. The person will in effect have waived his right to 
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attack the fairness of emission standards or implementation plans if he 
does not appeal them within thirty days of their promulgation. Id. 
§307(b)(1), (2). 
143 Senate Amendments of 1970, supra note 126, §308. 
144Id. 
145 The governor, on behalf of the stationary-source or moving-source 
polluter, in order to obtain a one-year extension, must demonstrate, 
prior to the date such source was required to begin compliance with the 
standard, that (a) good faith efforts were made to achieve compliance 
(b) the technology was not available to permit compliance; (c) interim 
control measures will guard the public health; (d) the continued opera.-
tion of such source is essential to national security or to the public 
health or welfare. Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §110(f)(1). 
146Id. §110(f)(2)(B). 
147 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1970). 
148 The following table illustrates the proposed automobile emission 
standards established by the Secretary of HEW pursuant to the 1967 
Act as compared with the standards established by Congress in the 
1970 Act. The figures represent the comparative emission levels of new 
motor vehicles for the four pollutants for which air quality criteria have 
been issued. 
AUTO EMISSIONS* 
[All figures in grams per mile] 
Hydro- Carbon 
carbons Monoxide 
New New 
Test Test 
U ncon trolled [pre-1968 vehicles] 14. 6 
1970 standard [pursuant to 1967 Act] 2.9 
Proposed 1975 standard [pursuant to 1967 Act] 0.5 
Proposed 1980 standard [pursuant to 1967 Act] 0.25 
The standards required by the Act [90% reduc-
tion to 1970 standard] 0.29 
116.3 
37.0 
11.0 
4.7 
3.7 
* Source: 116 Congo Rec. 16,113 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). 
Nitric 
Oxides 
Old 
Test 
4.0 
0.9 
0.4 
0.4 
Partic-
ulates 
Old 
Test 
0.4 
0.1 
0.03 
0.04 
In health effects these pollutants may cause cancer, headaches, dizzi-
ness, nausea, metabolic and respiratory diseases, and impairment of 
men tal processes. 
Studies show that exposure to 10 parts per million of carbon monoxide 
for approximately 8 hours may dull mental performance •... In heavy traffic 
situations, levels of 70, 80, or 100 parts per million are not uncommon for 
short periods. 
116 Congo Rec. 16,218 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). 
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149 116 Congo Rec. 16,218 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). 
160 42 U.S.C. §18S7f-1(a) (Supp. V, 1970). 
161 116 Congo Rec. 16,091 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). 
162 "Useful life" for light duty vehicles and engines (passenger ve-
hicles) is defined as being a period of use of five years or SO,OOO miles 
(or the equivalent), whichever occurs first. For any other type of motor 
vehicle or engine the same definition applies, unless the Administrator 
determines that a period of use of greater duration is appropriate. 
Clear Air Amendments of 1970 §202(d). 
153 Id. §202(a)(1). 
164 Id. §231. 
155Id. §§202(a)(2), 321(b). 
166 The term "model year" is defined as the manufacturer's annual 
production period (as determined by the Administrator) which in-
cludes January 1 of the calendar year. If a manufacturer has no annual 
production period, the term "model year" will mean the calendar year. 
And, to assure that vehicles manufactured before the beginning of a 
model year were not manufactured for the purposes of circumventing 
compliance with the federal standards, the Administrator may pre-
scribe regulations defining "model year" in a manner other than in the 
foregoing definition. Id. §202(b)(3). 
167 See the table in note 148 supra. The automobile is presently the 
single greatest polluter in our society. Its emissions are responsible for 
an estimated 60% of the nation's air pollution. Moreover, the rate of 
increase in the number of motor vehicles on the road is twice that of the 
U.S. birth rate. The U.s. population increases by about 6,000 persons 
per day. Motor vehicles are increasing at the rate of 12,000 per day. 116 
Congo Rec. 16,109 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). At present, there are over 
100 million motor vehicles in use in the U.S. Id. at 16,093. 
158 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §202(b)(4). 
159Id. §202(c). The National Academy of Sciences is required to sub-
mit semiannual reports to the Administrator and the Congress on the 
progress of its study. Id. §202(c) (3). The Administrator will furnish to 
the Academy any information which the latter deems necessary to the 
study. Id. §202(c) (4). 
16°Id. §202(b)(S). Much controversy surrounded the question of the 
one-year extension and whether the Administrator's decision to grant 
or deny such an extension should be reviewable. See discussion on pp. 
416-20 infra. 
161 See generally 116 Congo Rec. 16,093-097 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970) 
for the Senate floor debate on §202(b). Senator Griffin of Michigan 
vigorously opposed the provision, the only Senator to do so. He accused 
the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of playing "economic 
roulette" with millions of jobs. Senator Muskie, Chairman of the Sub-
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committee, responded that the Committee would rather play Russian 
roulette with the au tom akers than with the trapped inhabitants of 
urban America whose health was at stake. 116 Congo Rec. 16,096. For 
the reasons persuading the Subcommittee to adopt the severe emission 
standards for 1975 model automobiles, and the arguments of the auto 
industry, see generally 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 119, at 893-
904, 1031-080, 1576-579, 1596, 1608-660; 116 Congo Rec. 16,093-096 
(daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). 
162 See generally 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 119, at 1639-645, 
which reproduces the report in its entirety. 
163Id. at 1643. See also the table in note 148 supra. 
164 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1970). 
165 Senate Amendments of 1970, supra note 126, §211. See also note 
157 supra. 
166 Counsel for the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, 
Mr. Phillip T. Cummings, a draftsman of the Clean Air Amendments of 
1970, explained the reasons which led the House-Senate Conference 
Committee to delete section 211 of the Senate bill from the final version 
of the 1970 Act. Essentially, the conferees determined that section 211, 
which provided for federal testing and certification of pollution-control 
devices for used vehicles, and not for emission standards for used 
vehicles, " ... was not essential to the national air pollution control 
program;" that " ... alternative methods to deal with pollution from 
used vehicles are already available to the states and cities. For example, 
cities can restrict the use of motor vehicles in downtown areas, and 
would be required to do so, if necessary, under Section 110 of the 1970 
Amendments." 42 U.S.c. §1857f-6a(c) (Supp. V, 1970). See note 192 
infra. "And the states can legislate that owners install anti-air pollu-
tion devices on their used vehicles as one strategy in attaining ambient 
air quality standards." California has apparently already approved a 
device for the control of exhaust emissions from used motor vehicles. 
See note 168 infra. Apparently, the conferees also determined that the 
technology which would justify the establishment of federal emission 
standards for used vehicles has not yet been proven effective enough to 
warrant the imposition of national standards on all owners of used 
vehicles. Letter from Mr. Phillip T. Cummings to the Boston College 
Industrial and Commercial Law Review. Feb. 16, 1971, on file in the 
Law Review office. 
167 See discussion on pp. 387-88 supra. 
168 California has already approved the first control device to meet 
standards for reducing exhaust emissions from used vehicles manu-
factured from 1955-1965. The device will be installed at a cost of about 
$50 to the vehicle owner. Mandatory use of this system will follow once 
it is available on a mass basis. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 17, 1970, at 
14, col. 2. 
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169 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970). 
170 116 Congo Rec. 16,093 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). 
I7I See id. 
172 It is projected that by 1975, when the emission standards es-
tablished for new motor vehicles by the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 
take effect, an additional four to five generations of new automobiles 
will have been produced. See id. 
173 Under §209 of the 1967 Act, 42 U.S.c. §1857f-6a (Supp. V, 1970), 
the states are precluded from establishing emission standards for new 
vehicles. But this section is silent on state regulation of used motor 
vehicles and the writers have generally agreed that Congress intended 
to leave regulation of used vehicles to the states. See generally Currie, 
Motor Vehicle Air Pollu tion: State Au thority and Federal Pre-emption, 
68 Mich. L. Rev. 1083 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Currie]. Section 209 
of the 1967 Act was not amended by the 1970 Act. Further, §233 of the 
1970 Act precludes the states from regulating emissions from aircraft. 
But because §202 of the 1970 Act speaks only in terms of new motor 
vehicles and new motor vehicle engines, all classes of used motor vehicles 
including buses, trucks, taxicabs and numerous other types of vehicles 
which contribute substantially to air pollution, would apparently be 
regulated by the states. Only California has moved affirmatively to 
control pollution from used vehicles. If Congress does not amend the 
1970 Act by reinstating a provision similar to the deleted §211 of the 
Senate version of the Act, the states should follow California's lead. 
See also the discussion concerning federal preemption in the area of 
air pollution regulations at pp. 402-05 infra. 
174 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §§110, 116. See discussion on pp. 
supra. 
175 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970). 
176 116 Congo Rec. 16,109 (daily ed. Sept, 21, 1970). 
17742 U.S.c. §1857f-6a(a) (Supp. V, 1970) provided: 
No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to 
enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor 
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this subchapter. No State 
shall require certification, inspection, or any other approval relating to the 
control of emissions from any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine 
as condition precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registra-
tion of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment. 
178 Under the 1967 Act a "new motor vehicle" was defined as one for 
which equitable or legal title has never been transferred to an ultimate 
purchaser (first good faith purchaser for purposes other than resale); 
"new motor vehicle engine" was similarly defined. 42 U.S.c. §1857f-7 
(Supp. V, 1970). 
179 42 U.S.C. §1857f-6a(b) (Supp. V, 1970) provided: 
The Secretary shall) after notice and opportunity for public hearing, waive 
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application of this section to any state which has adopted standards (other 
than crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from new 
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, unless 
he finds that such State does not require standards more stringent than ap-
plicable Federal standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions 
or that such State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are 
not consistent with section 1857f-1(a) of this title. 
California was preferentially treated essentially because it pioneered 
efforts in automobile air pollution legislation antedating federallegisla-
tion. It was thus granted a "grandfather clause" in the 1967 Act. See 
Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air 
and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st 
Congo 2d Sess. 1583 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Senate Hearings]. 
See also Comment, 30 Ohio St. L. J. 516,536 (1969). California retains 
exemption from the federal standards under the 1970 Act. 
180 31 Fed. Reg. 5171 (1966); 33 Fed. Reg. 8306 (1968). 
181 The Senate Report on the 1967 Act indicated the intent of the 
Congress: 
While there has been a great deal of concern expressed regarding control of 
new vehicles little attention has been paid to control of used vehicles, either 
their emission or their use .... Any significant advance in control of used 
vehicles would result in a corresponding reduction in air pollution. These are 
areas in which the States and local government can be most effective. 
S. Rep. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1967). 
182 See 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 75-84, 1212, 1236, 
1365, 1583-584; Currie, supra note 173 at 1102; Comment, Air Pollu-
tion, Preemption, Local Problems, and the Constitution-Some Pi-
geonholes and Hatracks, 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 97, 106 (1968). The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recently given encourage-
ment to a narrow reading of the preemption provision. See Chrysler 
Corp. V. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499, 511 (2d Cir. 1969). 
183 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 1212. 
184Currie, supra note 173, at 1085. 
185 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 371-72. For a good 
discussion of the effects of these automotive pollutants upon health, see 
Currie, supra note 173, at 1084. 
186 See the quotation excerpted in note 181 supra. A bill to repeal the 
preemption provision of the 1967 Act was introduced in the House of 
Representatives by Congressman Mikva of Illinois. H.R. 16,013, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
187 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1970). 
188Id. 
189 Under the 1970 Act California retains its exemption; the pro-
vision of the 1967 Act so providing was left untouched in the 1970 Act. 
190 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1970). 
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191 42 U.S.c. §1857f-6a(c) (Supp. V, 1970). 
192 In other words, states and municipalities are free to restrict the 
use of motor vehicles in sections of a city at designated hours. This 
practice has become commonplace in the past year in cities as large as 
New York City (See Boston Globe, Oct. 13, 1970, at 12, col. 1) or as 
small as Malden, Mass. (Id. at 9, col. 1) which have begun to prohibit 
the operation of motor vehicles on certain streets at specific times. See 
also Newsweek, Jan. 4,1971, at 42. 
193 Revised regulations, including improved test procedures which 
should reduce pollution from new vehicles in the 1972, 1973 and 1974 
model years, were published in the Federal Register on November 10, 
1970, by the Secretary of HEW. The regulations are designed to reduce 
emissions of exhaust hydrocarbons by 80% and of carbon monoxide by 
69%, as compared to average emissions from pre-1968 model vehicles. 
The improved test procedures will take into account typical urban 
driving patterns, will sample actual emissions through the entire test 
cycle, and will rely on more accurate testing instruments than were 
previously used. The new regulations also eliminate the practice of 
averaging the test results of all cars in an engine class, which in the past 
allowed high-emission vehicles to get by on the performance of their 
low-emission brothers. The new procedures will apply to 1972 and sub-
sequent model year vehicles since the regulations took effect im-
mediately and prototype testing of vehicles normally begins one year 
in advance of production. See generally CCH Clean Air and Water 
News, No. 46, at 2 (Nov. 13, 1970). These new regulations were pro-
mulgated under the 1967 Act, however, which the Secretary of HEW 
has interpreted as not allowing assembly line testing. See discussion on 
pp. 389-90 supra. Presumably, with enactment of the 1970 Act, HEW 
will amend these regulations to include provisions for assembly line 
testing of vehicles. 
194 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §202(b). 
195 U.S. Const. amend, XIV, §1. 
196 See generally 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 75, 84, 
1195, 1212, 1236, 1365; Comment, Air Pollution, Pre-emption, Local 
Problems and the Constitution-Some Pigeonholes and Hatracks, 10 
Ariz. L. Rev. 97, 101-03 (1968). 
197 The Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution received numerous 
reports and testimony during the Senate Hearings, tending to establish 
the extreme health hazards posed by fuel additives such as sulfur and 
lead. Predictably, the manufacturers minimized the hazards; citizen 
groups and private societies maximized them. For the more informative 
reports, see 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 102-09, 433-35, 
539-72, 1064-080, 1113-177. The Department of HEW reported in 
mid-October, 1970, that lead poisoning "frequently causes sterility or 
early spontaneous abortion." This report was based on research con-
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ducted by the medical staff at the University of Alabama which found 
that mothers who drank lead-contaminated moonshine whiskey manu-
factured by persons using automobile radiators in stills gave birth to 
deformed babies. The study also indicated the rising death rates caused 
by lead poisoning among ghetto children who ate flakings oflead-based 
paint from the walls of slums dwellings. CCH Clean Air and Water 
News, No. 43, at 3 (Oct. 22, 1970). 
198 42 U.S.c. §1857b-1 (Supp. V, 1970). 
199 42 U.S.C. §1857f-6c(a) (Supp. V, 1970). 
200 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 483, 1044. 
201 For an excellent treatment of the effects of lead and other fuel 
additives on environment and health, see generally 1970 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 179, at 93-95, 102-09 (the effect of lead pollution on 
climate and weather patterns); 433-35 (HEW position on the effects of 
lead on health); 1016-020 (effects of lead on auto pollution devices); 
1175-177 (effects oflead on environment); 504-05 (arguments in favor 
of retaining lead as a gasoline additive). 
202 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §211(a). 
203Id. §211(c). This subsection also provides for federal preemption 
in the area of regulation of fuel and fuel additives. California is ex-
empted from this preemption under §211(c)(4) (B). In early November, 
1970, the federal government ordered the use of unleaded and low lead 
content gasoline of a maximum of 0.5 grams of lead per gallon in 
government-operated vehicles. The order will result in an annual con-
sumption of roughly 270 million gallons of low- or non-lead fuel in such 
vehicles, and the removal of 600 tons of metallic lead annually from 
such gasoline. Each gallon of regular gasoline presently contains about 
2.4 grams of lead. About 600,000 vehicles nationwide were affected by 
the order. This government action was designed to encourage the de-
velopment of refinery and distribution capabilities for the marketing of 
lead-free gasolines. The government is also engaged in a program to 
convert vehicles to the use of natural gas, which is 90% pollution free. 
CCH Clean Air and Water News, No. 45, at 4-5 (Nov. 6, 1970). 
204 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §211(a). Violation of the registra-
tion provisions of §211 subjects the fuel manufacturer to a "civil 
penalty" of $10,000 per day of violation. Id. §211(d). This penalty 
accrues to the United States government but is only recoverable in a 
civil suit. 
205Id. §211(c)(1). The Senate Committee observed two reasons for 
regulating the sale of a fuel. First, the combustion or evaporation of 
such fuel from any engine may present a direct hazard to health. 
Second, the fuel may have an adverse effect on the general welfare, or 
on an emission control system or device. Since the nature of the "gen-
eral welfare" is less well defined than the concept of "public health," 
the EPA is required to hold public hearings on any proposed prohibi-
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tion or control predicted upon the "general welfare." See S. Rep. No. 
91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (1970). 
206 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §211(c)(2)(C). 
207Id. §211 (c) (2)(A). 
208Id. §211(c)(2)(B). 
209Id. §211(c)(4)(C). 
21°Id. 
211 Id. §212. 
212Id. §104(a)(2)(B), (C). 
213 Spending for research relating to fuels and vehicles is authorized 
at $75 million for fiscal 1971, $125 million for fiscal 1972, and $150 
million for fiscal 1973. Id. §104(c). 
214 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970). 
215Id. at 5. 
216 The Board is to be composed of the Administrator or his designee, 
the Secretary of Transportation or his designee, the Chairman of the 
Council on Environmen tal Quali ty or his designee, the Director of the 
National Highway Safety Bureau in the Department of Transportation, 
the Administrator of General Services, and two members appointed by 
the President. The President will appoint the Board Chairman. Clean 
Air Amendments of 1970 §212(b). 
217Id. §212(d). In making its determination the Board must consider 
numerous criteria: safety of the vehicle, performance characteristics, 
reliability, potential, serviceability, fuel availability, noise level and 
maintenance costs as compared with the class or model of motor vehicle 
it may replace. Id. 
218Id. §212(e). 
219Id. 
220 Section 212 authorizes $55 million for the fiscal three-year period 
1971-73. This amount is in addition to the $350 million authorized 
under §104 for purposes of research and development of low-polluting 
vehicles and fuels. 
221 See generally 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 1012, 
1024-027 (Ford Motor Company indicates that it will not abandon the 
internal combustion engine), 1062 (General Motors takes the same 
position). By way of contrast, see id. at 197,360-62 (efforts by HEW to 
stimulate and federally finance development of alternatives), 904 
(Department of Transportation efforts), 1222 (Senator Muskie urging 
development of alternatives). The Subcommittee heard testimony dur-
ing the Hearings to the effect that General Motors spends $250 million 
annually on advertising: that it annually grosses $24 billion: and that 
it spends only $15 million on research and development Id. at 1222. 
222Id. 
223 General Motors, in November, 1970, paid $50 million to buy the 
rights to this small German rotary, as opposed to piston engine. The 
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engine, developed in 1954 by Felix Wankel, is essentially a variant of 
the internal combustion engine, but GM seems to be confident that it 
can be refined sufficiently to meet the 1975 emission standards. The 
automakers seem to have ruled out turbines, steam engines and battery 
powered models as ei ther too costly or impractical. In the Wankel engine, 
gasoline is burned, the energy produced is harnessed to turn a shaft 
which drives the wheels. But the energy in the Wankel engine is cap-
tured more directly than in a piston engine. Instead of first creating an 
up-and-down motion and then coverting that to a rotating motion, the 
Wankel burns its fuel in unusual oblong chambers forcing a triangular 
rotor to turn in a circular motion. The triangular rotor is attached 
directly to the drive shaft, which powers the wheels. Auto engineers 
indicate that about 90% of the pollution caused by the piston engine 
occurs during the first few minutes or miles of operation. The problem 
is that the engine is still cold, and even effective pollution-control de-
vices have trouble cleaning the exhaust if the engine is not hot enough. 
The Wankel engine heats up almost instantly, thus allowing the clean-
ing device to burn off harmful fumes. The Wankel seems to provide 
numerous appealing features ranging from low costs to adequate power. 
Most important, however, is the observation by University of Michigan 
researchers that with the help of relatively unsophisticated devices, the 
Wankel has already come "very close" to meeting the 1975 standards 
required by the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. With GM's resources 
behind it, the Wankel could very possibly be developed to meet the 
1975 emission standards. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 19,1970, at 1, col. 1. 
224 "Detroit Fights Back," Newsweek, Nov. 30, 1970, at 81. 
225 A group of students from Wayne State University in Detroit re-
cently buttressed hopes for attainment of the 1975 standards by win-
ning the 1970 Clean Air "race" in a vehicle powered by a modified in-
ternal combustion engine. They drove a Ford vehicle equipped with 
two platinum catalytic mufflers for the control of hydrocarbons and 
carbon monoxide; and two additional catalytic mufflers for control of 
nitrogen oxides. The vehicle was equipped with an exhaust gas recircu-
lation system, electric fuel pump, insulated fuel lines and a temperature-
sensing carburator; it burned lead-free gasoline. To win the cross-
country "race" from Massachusetts to California, a vehicle had to 
perform well, be practical, relatively low in cost, capable of mass pro-
duction, and low in pollutant emissions. Emissions from the Wayne 
State vehicle were well below the 1975 standards set by the 1970 Act. 
1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 1656-658; New Republic, 
Oct. 3, 1970, at 8. Subsequently, the National Air Pollution Control 
Administration (NAPCA) invited the Wayne State group to test their 
vehicle at federal laboratories under the federal Clean Car Incentive 
Program to see how viable an alternative it might be to motor vehicles 
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presently used by the public. CCH Clean Air and Water News, No. 41, 
at 13 (Oct. 9, 1970). 
226 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 899, 1193, 1227-228. 
2'¥l See 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 851, 1366, 1656-659. 
228 Cal. S. Bill 778, 1969 Reg. Sess.; 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 
179 at 1366. 
229 Amendment No. 815 to S. 3229, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
230 On prohibiting the sale of the internal combustion engine, or of 
vehicles with excessive hosepower, see Currie, Motor Vehicle Air 
Pollution: State Authority and Federal Pre-emption, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 
1083,1100-101 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Currie]. 
231 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §206. 
232 See discussion on pp. 401-05 supra. 
233 To enforce the automobile standards promulgated in the 1970 Act, 
the EPA inspectors are authorized "to enter, at resonable times, any 
plant or other establishment of such manufacturer, for the purpose of 
conducting tests of vehicles or engines in the hands of the manufac-
turer," or to inspect "records, files, papers, processes, controls and 
facilities used by such manufacturer in conducting tests under regula..-
tions of the Administrator." Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §206(c). 
See S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1970). The Admin-
istrator may request the assistance of qualified independent laboratories 
in testing vehicles. Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §206(a)(2). 
234 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §206(b)(2). 
235Id. §206(b) (2) (A). Under §203(a)(1) of the 1970 Act, vehicles 
without the Administrator's certification may not be introduced into 
commerce, subject to the penalties prescribed in §205. 
236Id. §206(b)(2)(B)(i). 
237Id. §206(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
238Id. §206(e). 
239 The warranty must provide that the vehicle or engine is: 
... (1) designed, built, and equipped so as to conform at the time of 
sale with applicable regulations under section 202, and (2) free from 
defects in materials and workmanship which cause such vehicle or 
engine to fail to conform with applicable regulations for its useful 
life .... 
Id. §207(a). Useful life is defined under §202(d) as being five years or 
50,000 miles, whichever occurs first. 
24°Id. §202(d). 
241Id. §207(d). 
242Id. §207(e). During the Senate Hearings the Committee heard 
evidence that in 1965 an automobile manufacturer declared a $25 in-
crease in automobile prices for reasons wholly related to an alleged new 
anti-pollution device; it was later disclosed that the actual cost of the 
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device to the manufacturer was only $5. Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, 
and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the 
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91 Cong., 2d Sess. 1224 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as 1970 Senate Hearings]. See generally id, at 1580, 1605. 
It was suggested at the Senate Hearings, however, that this disclosure 
requirement may violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Act Id. at 1605. 
243 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §207(d). 
244Id. §207(c)(1). 
245Id. 
246Id. §207(b)(2). 
247Id. §207(b). See Wall Street Journal, Dec. 17, 1970, at 3, col. 2. 
248 The anti-pollution devices could add as much as $300 to the cost of 
each automobile. Wall Street Journal. Nov. 19, 1970, at 1, col. 1. 
249 Many courts still require that there be privity of contract be-
tween the manufacturer and purchaser before holding the manufac-
turer responsible under a warranty. In these jurisdictions, confusion 
may result as to what rights a second or third purchaser has with respect 
to the warranty, despite the provision in §207(b) that "the warranty 
under such regulations shall run to the ultimate purchaser and each 
subsequent purchaser .... " For discussion of the issues raised by the 
warranty provision, see generally 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 
242, at 139, 1013-015, 1573, 1591, 1622-623, 1667. 
250 See discussion on p. 401-05 supra. 
251 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §110(a)(2)(G). 
252 See discussion on p. 401-05 supra. 
253 See note 168 supra. 
254 42 U.S.C. §1857f-6b (Supp. V, 1970). 
255 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 379-80. 
256 See note 80 supra. 
257 116 Congo Rec. 16,093 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). 
258 See discussion on pp. 389-90 supra. 
259 42 U.S.c. §1857f-3 (Supp. V, 1970). 
260 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 380. For a comprehensive 
treatment of the use of injunctions in air pollution enforcement see 
Comment, Equity and the EcO-System: Can Injunctions Clear the Air?, 
68 Mich. L. Rev. 1254 (1970). 
261 "Person" is defined in the 1967 Act as including "an individual, 
corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, and po-
litical subdivision of a State." 42 U.S.C. 1857h(e) (Supp. V, 1970). 
Thus, under §205 of the 1970 Act, the penalty provision, a manufac-
tuer or importer of a non-complying motor vehicle is subject to the 
$10,000 civil penalty. But under §203(a)(6) of the 1970 Act, "im-
porter" includes private persons as well, so that any person or private 
citizen who imports a foreign vehicle which does not comply with 
federal emission standards is also subject to a civil penalty of $10,000. 
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262 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §205. 
263Id. 
264 The Secretary of HEW did not levy any fines under the 1967 Act, 
despite the fact that in some cases up to 80% of the vehicles tested from 
the road were failing to comply with the emission standards issued for 
the prototypes. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 363, 380. 
265 During the Senate Hearings, Senator Muskie observed: "I know 
one of the things industries don't like is this public participation. I like 
to give it the blessing of national legislation by writing it into the law." 
1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 152. Since government agen-
cies lack the adequate personnel, both in numbers and in experience, to 
control air pollution effectively, private citizen suits can be a great aid 
to controlling the problem. 
266 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §109(a)(1). 
267 I d. 110( a) (1). 
268 I d. §304. 
269Id. 
270 In June of 1969, at the annual meeting of the Air Pollution Control 
Association in New York, ranking officials of the National Air Pollu-
tion Control Administration (NAPCA) of the Department of HEW 
openly encouraged such suits. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 
817. 
271 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 818; S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1970). 
272 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §304(a). 
273 "Amount in controversy" appears to have little meaning in air 
pollution suits. The "amount of damage" to the public health and wel-
fare is not susceptible to easy measurement. Also, absent the citizen-
ship provision in §304 of the 1970 Act, a local polluter of the same res-
idence or citizenship as the plaintiffs would not be amenable to suit 
in the federal district courts. The elimination of diversity and jurisdic-
tional amount considerations circumvents any barriers to federal juris-
diction which may result from the Supreme Court decision in Snyder 
v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), which held that in a class action, sepa-
rate and distinct claims may not be aggregated to provide the $10,000 
jurisdictional amount required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
274 The original Senate Committee version of §304 did include class 
actions as well as citizen suits but the Committee decided to avoid the 
confusion and technicalities of class actions enforcing air pollution laws 
and so eliminated them. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 622. 
The provision is now drawn to avoid problems raised by the class action 
provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Traditional class ac-
tions under Federal Rule 23 involve (a) identification of the class of per-
sons whose interests have been damaged; (b) identification of amount 
~ of total damage done to determine if there is jurisdiction in the federal 
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court; and (c) allocation of any damages recovered. None of these issues 
pertains to the citizen suit provision. No jurisdictional amount is re-
quired under §304 and no provision is made for the recovery of property 
or personal damages. S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Congo 2d Sess. 38 
(1970). Provision is made, however, under §304(e) of the Act, to pre-
serve the rights of persons as a class or as individuals under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement or any other relief. Thus, class ac-
tions are still available in suits predicated upon common law theories 
such as nuisance, and Congress made it clear that it is not preempting 
the field. For discussion of the question of class actions in pollution 
suits, see Comment, Equity and the EcO-system: Can Injunctions Clear 
the Air?, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1254, 1272-274 (1970). 
276 Suit cannot be filed until the Administrator has had sixty days, 
after receipt of notice, within which to institute enforcement proceed-
ings to abate the alleged violation. In addition, if the Administrator or 
state has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a 
federal or state court, no citizen suit may be filed. Any person may, 
however, intervene in such an action in federal court, as a matter of 
right. Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §304(b). An exception to these 
requirements permits the filing of a citizen suit immediately after notice 
has been given, if the alleged violation involves emissions of "hazard-
ous pollutants" under §§112(c)(1)(B) or 113(a). If not already a party 
to the action, the Administrator may intervene as a matter of right in 
any citizen suit. If abatement proceedings are not begun within 60 days 
following notice, or if the citizen believes that enforcement efforts ini-
tiated by the agency are inadequate, the citizen could then file his ac-
tion. Because federal facilities generate considerable air pollution, pro-
vision is also made for suits by citizens against the government. Clean 
Air Amendments of 1970 §§118, 304. 
276Id. §304(d). This provision eliminates potential financial barriers 
to citizen groups with limited resources who may wish to initiate abate-
ment actions against comparatively wealthy industrial polluters. It has 
been estimated that the costs of bringing such actions can amount to as 
much as $500,000. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 1199. On 
the other hand, the provision also discourages frivolous suits, or suits of 
harassment, since a court can award court costs, attorney fees and ex-
pert witness fees to the alleged polluter, should the plaintiff lose. But 
under §304(d) the court may, if an injunction is sought, require the 
filing of a bond or equivalent security in accordance with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
277 It was suggested during the Senate Hearings that the in terrorem 
effect of potential private damage actions would cause industries to 
initiate preventive measures against pollution. 1970 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 242, at 826. The allowance of recovery of private damages 
alone, however, without an accompanying abatement order could frus-
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trate the purpose of the anti-air pollution statutes. Id. at 853. Illustra-
tive of such a result is the recent decision by the N ew York Court of 
Appeals in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 26 N.Y. 2d 219, 257 
N.E.2d 870 (1970), which instructed the trial court to grant an injunc-
tion against a polluting cement company. The court expressly stated, 
however, that if the company paid "permanent damages" to the plain-
tiff the injunction was to be vacated, thus permitting the cement plant 
to continue polluting the air. The General Counsel of the Environ-
mental Defense Fund, in a letter to Senator Muskie, observed with re-
spect to the Boomer case, " ... the allowance of damages-especially 
permanent damages-without also requiring abatement of the polluting 
activity tends to assure the perpetuation, instead of the abatement, of 
pollution." 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 853. For further 
discussion on the question of allowing recovery of private damages un-
der the 1970 Act, see generally id. at 623, 818, 826, 853, 1182-183. 
278Id. at 623. 
279 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §304(a)(1). With the aid of §§114 
(c) and 208(b), which require that the polluter keep records and reports, 
which are available to the public, to demonstrate compliance with the 
standards, proof of violation of standards will be facilitated. The ques-
tion thus will be one of fact as to whether there has been compliance, 
and not one of law to establish whether pollution did or did not exist. 
But there may be a Fifth Amendment problem, with respect to §§1141 
(c) and 208(b) of the Act, on the issue of self-incrimination. This ques-
tion has never been tested in the courts, despite the fact that the 1967 
Act contained a provision similarly requiring the maintenance of dis-
coverable records and reports. 42 U.S.c. §1857f-6 (Supp. V, 1970). 
280 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 826, 833-34, 839. For a 
probing discussion which elaborates upon the questions presented by 
the citizen suits provision, see the memorandum submitted to the Sen-
ate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, 1970 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 242, at 1585-590. See generally id. at 816-61. The automo-
bile manufacturers were against the citizen suits provision for obvious 
reasons. For the major criticisms of this provision by its opponents, see 
generally id. at 1606, 1625. See also the Senate floor debate on the pro-
vision. 116 Congo Rec. 16, 113-116 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). 
281 See discussion on pp. 388-89 supra. 
282 See J. I. Case CO. V. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,430-33 (1964), in which 
the Supreme Court found it necessary to "read in" a private cause of 
action to enforce proxy rules because the Court reasoned that (1) pri-
vate enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to 
Commission action; and (2) as in antitrust treble damages litigation, 
the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves as an effective 
weapon in the enforcement of proxy requirements. See Perma Life 
Mufflers, Inc. V. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), in 
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which the Court referred to private suits as "a bulwark of antitrust 
enforcement." 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 1482-484. 
283 The appeal procedures under the stationary-source provisions 
(Title I) of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, are discussed supra at 
pp.397-99. 
284 116 Congo Rec. 16,224 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). 
285 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §202(b)(5). 
286 Senator Muskie explained the rationale of this timetable: 
We wanted the provision for appeal to be made available late enough in this 
S-year time frame so that the industry would make, and be forced to make, 
a good faith effort toward achieving the objectives of the bill before resorting 
to the courts. At the time, we wanted to provide that there would be suffi-
cient time to resolve the appeal and to get a decision so that the industry 
could then respond to that decision in its production schedules. 
116 Congo Rec. 16,227 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). In this manner, Con-
gress has provided the automobile industry three years "lead time" in 
order to plan production schedules, model changes, etc. 
287 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §202(b)(5)(D). 
288Id. 
289 I d. This section distinguishes between the "public interest" and 
the "public health and welfare" thus raising interesting questions con-
cerning what precisely is encompassed by the term "public interest" if 
"health and welfare" are not. For example, if it appeared that the 
economy of the United States would suffer severely as a result of sanc-
tions imposed for failure to meet the 1975 standards thus at least aug-
uably harming the public interest, is it possible that in this circum-
stance, the Administrator could grant an extension, notwithstanding 
the mandate of the Act that he do everything possible to protect the 
"health and general welfare of the public"? This provision in effect may 
allow the Administrator to base his decision upon economic and tech-
nological, rather than health, considerations-precisely contrary to the 
salu brious in ten t of Ti tle II of the Act. In this connection it should be 
noted that nowhere in the 1970 Act is the term "public interest" de-
fined. 
290Id. 
291Id. 
292Id. This provision could be the most important of the findings the 
Administrator must make. In considering a petition for extension of the 
deadline, the Administrator must take into account not simply the 
technology developed by the automobile manufacturers themselves, 
but technology developed by any engineering concern, if it has proved 
effective in tests. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1970, at 1, col. 7; at 56, col. 
1-2. See also discussion concerning development of low-emission alter-
natives to the internal combustion engine, pp. 407-08 supra. 
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293 Clean Air Amendements of 1970 §202(b)(5)(C). The Nixon Ad-
ministration, yielding to bitter opposition by the auto industry, at-
tempted to pressure the House-Senate Conference Committee into 
eliminating the 1975 and 1976 deadlines by which the automakers must 
achieve compliance with the exhaust emission standards. Secretary of 
HEW Elliot Richardson wrote to the Senate-House Conference Com-
mittee six weeks after the Conference had already accepted the dead-
lines, and indicated that the Administration desired that the 1975 date 
be changed to a "hopeful target" but not a deadline, and that the EPA 
Administrator be given authority to grant an unlimited series of one-
year extensions. Fortunately, the conferees rejected the President's 
proposal, and decided that after the first one-year administrative exten-
sion only Congress could grant further relief. N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 
1970, at 1, col. 7; Wall Street Journal, Dec. 17, 1970, at 3, col. 2. 
294 5 U.S.c. §§701-06 (Supp. V, 1970). 
295 For the Senate floor debate on the question of judicial review of 
the granting or denial of a one-year extension see generally 116 Congo 
Rec. 16,218-228 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). 
296Id. at 16,225. 
297Id. at 16,220. 
298 See generally id. at 16,218-228. 
299Id. at 16,224. 
3OOId. at 16,220. 
301Id. at 16,219 
302Id. at 16,218. 
303Id. 
304Id. at 16,220. 
305 I d. at 16,225. 
306Id. Under §307 of the Act the EPA Administrator is given these 
same powers. 
307 In the course of the Senate debate on judicial review, Senator 
Baker argued: 
The court in the sanctity of its judicial undertakings in the calm, cool, 
deliberations of its fact-finding function, in its detachment from the im-
mediate pressures, is best suited to undertake this task than 535 legislators 
are, 435 of them standing for election in twelve months and one-third of the 
Senate standing for election in 1976, to say nothing of the pressure and heat 
and the confrontation of a political campaign for President in 1976. The 
Congress is probably the least likely place to have clear, calm determination 
of that fact issue. 116 Congo Rec. 16,225 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). 
308 I d. at 16,226. 
309Id. 
310 Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 17255, H.R. Rep. No. 
91-1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
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311 See the reasons enumerated on p. 417-18 supra. See also the dis-
cussion of the judicial review provisions in the portion of the 1970 Act 
dealing with stationary-source polluters, pp. 397-99 supra. 
312 See the cases cited in note 139 supra. 
313 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098 
(D.C. Cir. 1970). 
314Id. at 1097. 
315 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1970). 
316 116 Congo Rec. 16,226 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). 
317 See discussion on pp. 421 et seq. infra, concerning the constitu-
tional issues raised by §202(b) of the Act. 
318 See Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and 
Federal Pre-emption, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1083, 1100-101 (1970). 
319 I d. at 1101; Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546. Before the 
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public 
Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 120-21,887,893 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
1970 Senate Hearings]. 
320 See discussion on pp. 421 et seq. infra. 
321 During Senate floor debate on the 1970 Act, Senator Muskie dis-
counted industry pessimism regarding ability to meet the proposed 
standards: 
[T]he attitude of the industry prior to the time it was required to conform to 
the California standards was the same as it is in this case. They said it could 
not be done. But, it was done .•.. 
. . . Since the late 1940's, a quarter of a century ago, the industry has been 
occupied with this problem by its own statements. It has been developing 
technology. Every time it is pressed to apply technology it pleads for time. 
It says it is not possible. It said this to California in 1964. It said this to us in 
the hearings in 1964 and in 1965. It says it again now. 
116 Congo Rec. 16,228 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). 
322 116 Congo Rec. 16,092 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). 
323 See discussion on pp. 388-91 supra. 
324 116 Congo Rec. 16,220 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). 
325Id. 
326Id. at 16,220-221. 
327Id. at 16,221. 
328Id. 
329Id. For an elaboration of the automobile industry's economic argu-
ments, see 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 319, at 1608-610, 1626. 
330 In an exchange with Senator Griffin on the Senate floor, Senator 
Muskie commented: 
The deadline is based not, •.• on economic and technological feasibility, but 
on considerations of pu blic health. We think, on the basis of the exposure we 
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have had to this problem, that this is a necessary and reasonable standard to 
impose upon the industry. If the industry cannot meet it, they can come 
back [to the Congress]. 
116 Congo Rec. 16,095 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). 
331 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 319, at 639-40. In discussing the 
congressional power to act in the interst of the health and safety of the 
people, Justice Frankfurter's remarks on the Food and Drug Act of 
1906 are equally applicable to the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. 
The Food and Drugs Act of 1906 was an exertion by Congress of its power to 
keep impure and adulterated food and drugs out of the channels of com-
merce. By the Act of 1938 Congress extended the range of its control over 
illicit and noxious articles and stiffened the penalties for disobedience. The 
purposes of this legislation thus touch phases of the lives and health of 
people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely 
beyond self-protection. Regard for these purposes should infuse construction 
of the legislation if it is to be treated as a working instrument of government 
and not merely as a collection of English words. 
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943). See brief for 
petitioners, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Finch, 1970 Senate 
Hearings, supra note 319, at 639-40. 
332 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 319, at 1025. 
333 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §206. 
334 Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and Federal 
Pre-emption, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1083, 1100 (1970). 
335 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3. The extent of congressional power to 
regulate commerce among the states was defined by Chief Justice 
Marshall in the landmark case Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
1, 196 (1824): 
It is the power to regulate; that is to prescribe the role by which commerce 
is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete 
in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent and acknowledges no limita-
tions other than are prescribed in the Constitution .... It is no objection 
to the assertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise 
is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police 
power of the states. 
336 See Edelman, Federal Air and Water Control: The Application of 
the Commerce Power to Abate Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 
33 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1067,1071 (1965); Comment, The Federal Air 
Pollution Program, 1968 Wash. U.L.Q. 283, 219-21 (1968); Powell v. 
U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 512 (1949); United States v. Bishop 
Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624, 630 (1968). 
337 287 F. Supp. 624, 630 (1968). 
338Id. at 630. 
339 Id. at 631. 
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340 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941). The Court ob-
served that: 
Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning the re-
strictions which may appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce, is 
free to exclude from the commerce articles whose use in the states for which 
they are destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals 
or welfare .... 
341 Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436 (1925). See also Ameri-
can Power and Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90,99 (1946); North Amer-
ican Co. v. S.E.C., 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1945). In the latter case, the Court 
reiterated "the well settled principle that Congress may impose rele-
vant conditions and requirements on those who use the channels of in-
terstate commerce in order that those channels will not become the 
means of promoting or spreading evil, whether of a physical, moral, or 
economic nature." 327 U.S. at 705. Thus, the Supreme Court has upheld 
the application of the commerce power to the interstate transportation 
oflottery tickets, Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); stolen cars, 
Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925); kidnapped persons, 
Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936); prostitution, Caminetti v. 
United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 
308 (1913); and to racial discrimination, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. 
v. United States 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
342 See note 148 supra for a table comparing the standards originally 
projected by HEW for 1975 with the standards Congress established in 
§202(b) of the 1970 Act. 
343 In a recent New York Court of Appeals ruling, the court awarded 
damages but refused to issue an injunction absolutely prohibiting op-
eration since immediate shutdown was "too drastic," and development 
of abatement techniques required total industry effort over an indeter-
minate period of time. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 26 
N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (1970). Arguably, however, the auto 
industry has had more than the 1970 to 1973 period to develop its tech-
niques; it was told by Congress to begin in 1964. The period from 1964 
to 1975 seems sufficient. See 116 Congo Rec. 16,095 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 
1970). 
344 During both the Senate Hearings and the Senate floor debate on 
the 1970 Act, advocates of the auto industry maintained that the al-
legedly minimal advantages to be gained through the Act were far out-
weighed by the economic impact which would be suffered by the auto 
industry and the nation. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 319, at 1031, 
1615. 116 Congo Rec. 16,221 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). By way of con-
trast, see Jackson, Foreword: Environmental Quality, the Courts, and 
the Congress, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1073 (1970), in which the author argues 
THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970 465 
that economic arguments should not be given much weight as regards 
stationary sources of pollution. 
345 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
346Id. at 506, quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 199 
(1881). 
347 116 Congo Rec. 16,220 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). 
348 116 Congo Rec. 16,095 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). 
349Id. 
350 Department of Health V. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 100 
N.J. Super. 366,382,242 A.2d 21, 29 (1968). 
351 See Consolidation Coal CO. V. Kandle, 105 N.J. Super. 104, 114, 
251 A.2d 295, 300 (1969). 
352 One writer has indicated that congressional findings should rarely, 
if ever, be disturbed on procedural grounds: 
A legislature is theoretically competent to dispose of matters coming before 
it without according procedural formalities to affected interests. It is vested 
with full discretion and final authority subject to constitutional limitations 
... An elaborate process of committee investigations, hearings and reports 
has been developed for this purpose [law-making]. The extent to which this 
procedure shall be used in particular instances, however, and the degree of 
participation which shall be permitted to those concerned remain wholly 
within legislative control. 
Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-making, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 
259, 273-74 (1938). See also Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal 
Rule-Making Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits or 
Contracts, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 540 (1970); Daddario, Technology As-
sessment Legislation, 7 Harv. J. Legis. 507 (1970). 
353 See Northwestern Laundry V. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 
(1916); Sheafer v. Joseph Breen, Inc., 263 App. Div. 135, 31 N.Y.S. 
2d 543 (1941); United States V. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 
624 (1968); Consolidation Coal CO. V. Kandle, 251 A.2d 295, 105 N.J. 
Super. 104 (1969). 
354 See United States V. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624, 
630-31 (1968): 
A court's review of such a Congressional finding is limited. The only 
questions are whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that air 
pollution affects commerce, and if it had such a basis, whether the means 
selected to eliminate the evil are reasonable and appropriate. 
355 See, e.g., Ballentine V. Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 70,164 S.W.2d 378, 382 
(1942), in which the Missouri Supreme Court summarizes the majority 
view on the constitutionality of air pollution legislation by quoting 
from an earlier case, Nelson V. City of Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 16, 19, 
127 N.W. 445, 447 (1910): 
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The methods, regulations, and restrictions to be imposed to attainJ so far as 
may be, results consistent with the public welfare, are purely of legislative 
cognizance. The courts have no power to determine the merits of conflicting 
theories nor to declare that a praticular method of advancing and protecting 
the public is superior or likely to insure greater safety or better protection 
than others. The legislative determination of the methods, restrictions and 
regulations is final, except when so arbitrary as to be violative of the consti-
tutional rights of the citizens. 
356 Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486,492 
(1916) : 
Nor is there any valid Federal constitutional objection in the fact that the 
regulation may require the discontinuance of the use of property or subject 
the occupant to large expense in complying with the terms of the law or 
ordinance. 
357 Department of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 100 
N.J. Super. 366,394,242 A.2d 21, 35 (1968). But see People v. Cunard 
White Star, Ltd., 280 N.Y. 413, 21 N.E.2d 489 (1939), in which the 
court held that a regulation of smoke is valid only if it is limited to pro-
hibiting discharge of smoke avoidable by use of modern and practicable 
methods; that if it were impossible to avoid smoke, then the ordinance 
was clearly unreasonable, and an undue burden on interstate commerce 
exceeding the power of the state; People v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa 
Fe Ry. Co., 268 Cal. App.2d 501, 74 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968), which held 
that a state statute placed an undue and unreasonable burden on rail-
road operations because the technology did not exist which could cure 
the defect in question, the emission of great quantities of smoke by lo-
comotives. The court in that case distinguished Huron Portland Ce-
ment Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) in which the Supreme Court 
upheld a city smoke-abatement ordinance, because in Huron, technol-
ogy to control the emission of smoke was available. It should be re-
membered, however, the Cunard and Atchison cases involved state stat-
utes, in which the police power was held to conflict with the power of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce. There would not be such a 
conflict in a suit brought by the automakers attacking the emission stan-
dards under the 1970 Act. The issue there would be whether Congress 
itself has the power to regulate, i.e., prohibit, the use of a type of engine 
which is clearly injurious to the public health, and not a conflct between 
federal and state regulatory powers. It is also important torecognize 
that in 1939, when Cunard was decided, air pollution was not a serious 
threat to health; and that the Atchison case dealt with the railroad in-
dustry which was rapidly dying. The au tom akers have alternatives at 
their disposal which were not available to the railroad industry. 
358 See Department of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 100 
N.J. Super. 366,242 A.2d 21 (1968). 
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359 See, e.g., People v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 268 Cal. 
App.2d 501, 74 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968). 
360 Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 
(1970). 
361 Student groups and private and government researchers demon-
strated in 1970 that alternatives such as electric and steam propulsion 
systems already exist, and that, although at present they are still short 
of economic practicality, these systems could be developed by the auto-
makers so that mass production could become a reality. In addition, 
two vehicles propelled by the internal combustion engine, but using 
different types of fuels, did achieve the strict 1975 emission standards. 
See 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 319, at 1656-657. But the auto-
makers have chosen to gamble on a modification of the internal com-
bustion engine. See note 197 supra. 
362 Department of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 242 
A.2d 21, 35, 100 N.J. Super. 366, 393-94 (1968); Oriental Boulevard 
Co. v. Heller, 58 Misc.2d 920, 297 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1969). 
363 386 U.S. 374, 388 (1932); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & 
Enginemen v. Chicago, RI. & P.R Co., 393 U.S. 129, 139 (1968). 
364 Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1961). 
865 Inverse condemnation is the popular description of a cause of action 
against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has 
been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal 
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking 
agency. 
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 180, 376 P.2d 100, 101 
(1962). 
366 The courts have held that the deprivation of the former owner rather than 
the accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking. 
Governmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been 
held, if its effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his 
interest in the subject matter, to amount to a taking. 
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1944). See 
generally Symposium, Inverse Condemnation: Unintended Physical 
Damage, 20 Hastings L.J. 431 (1969); Van Alstyne, Statutory Modifi-
cation of Inverse Condemnation: Deliberately Inflicted Injury or De-
struction, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 617 (1968); Sax, Takings and the Policy 
Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36, (1964); Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: 
The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 
3 (1966). 
367 In United States v. Caltex (Phillipines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 
(1952), the Supreme Court held that "in times of imminent peril ... 
the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy the property of a few that 
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the property of many and the lives of many more could be saved." 
368 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). In Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922), the Supreme Court 
expressed a similar view: 
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property 
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general 
law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation 
and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation 
must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. 
369 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
37°Id. at 48. 
371 See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty 
Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 63 
(1962). 
372 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952). 
373 See, e.g., House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 
Ca1.2d 384, 391, 153 P.2d 950, 953 (1944). 
374Id. The court includes in such situations the destruction of dis-
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